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MISREPRESENTATION B Y LAWYERS ABOUT
CREDENTIALS OR EXPERIENCE
VINCENT R. JOHNSON" & SHAWN M. LOVORN""

I. The Problem
To what extent must a lawyer disclose to a client or a potential client
unfavorable facts relating to the lawyer's credentials or prior experience?
Must a lawyer reveal, with respect to the area of the law in which the
layperson seeks legal services, the nature and extent of the lawyer's training,
prior work, or results obtained on behalf of other clients?
For example, is it necessary for a lawyer to tell a client that the lawyer:
(1) failed, did poorly in, or neglected to take relevant law school courses? (2)
has handled no, only one, or just a few similar cases? (3) has not performed
similar work in a long time or without assistance from another lawyer? (4)
lacks board certification in the relevant spec iaIty? (5) has never handled a case
involving injuries or damages as great as those in the proposed representation?
(6) was unable to secure, or secured an inadequate. recovery when
representing a client with a similar claim? (7) was subject to sanctions,
grievances, or malpractice claims in connection with prior work? (8) was
asked to leave a former law firm because of allegedly poor work habits? (9)
is presently, or was previously, suspended from the practice of law? (10) was
earlier disbarred, then subsequently reinstated? (11) is now, or was previously,
addicted to illegal drugs? or (12) was charged with, or found guilty of,
criminal conduct relating to a client or other matter? These questions are
important because lawyers must continually decide what information should
be provided to clients.
The issue here is not competence to undertake the proposed representation
but disclosure of information relating to the client's selection of counselor
continuation of representation. With respect to the obligation of competence,

* Associate Dean and Professor of Law, St. Mary's University School of Law, San
Antonio, Texas. LL.D., St. Vincent College (Pennsylvania), 1991; LL.M., Yale University,
1979; J.D., University of Notre Dame, 1978; B.A., St. Vincent College, 1975. Dean Johnson
is a member of the American Law Institute and has served as a Fellow at the Supreme Court of
the United States and a Fulbright Scholar in China and Romania. Preparation of this article was
assisted by St. Mary's University law students Claire G. Hargrove, Jacqueline F. Dieterle,
Armistead M. Long, Carlos A. Garcia, Patrick Y. Howell, Daniel Austin Ortiz, and Teresa
Ahnberg.
** St. Mary's University School of Law, J.D. Class of 2005. B.S., St. Edward's
University,2001. Articles Editor, Volume 36, St. Mary's Law Journal.
529

530

OKLAHOMA LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 57:529

the law is clear that a lawyer may accept a case in an area in which the lawyer
has not previously practiced, provided that the attorney can rise to the level of
performance expected of a reasonably prudent attorney through self-study or
by associating with other lawyers with whom the client consents. l However,
even if competence can be achieved in a timely fashion, the question remains
whether the lawyer must tell the client that he presently lacks certain
credentials or experience. In addition, must the lawyer provide the client with
information - particularly, unfavorable information - upon which the client
can judge the breadth, depth, and efficacy of the lawyer's credentials and
experience?
Authorities appropriately condemn dishonesty by attorneys in the broadest
terms. 2 In moving from moral principles to legal liability, however, it is
important to think carefully about when it is that a lawyer's conduct misleads
a client in a way that is actionable. As discussed below, whether liability will
be imposed depends upon the nature of the misrepresentation, the status of the
plaintiff, the theory of liability, and the presence of competing interests or
special considerations.
First, there are three important types of conduct that may result in
misrepresentation: (1) silence; (2) potentially misleading statements, such as
half-truths and statements of opinion, including puffing; and (3) outright
deception based on false statements. Tort law typically deals with these types

I. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONouer R. I.l (2002) ("A lawyer shall provide
competent representation to a client. Competent representation requires the legal knOWledge,
skill, thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for the representation."). The
comment to Rule 1.1 provides:
A lawyer need not necessarily have special training or prior experience to handle
legal problems of a type with which the lawyer is unfamiliar.... A lawyer can
provide adequate representation in a wholly novel field through necessary study.
Competent representation can also be provided through the association of a lawyer
of established competence in the field in question.
Id. R. 1.1 cmt. 2. See generally RESTATEMENT (1'HIRo) OFTHE LAW GoVERNING LAWYERS § 52
(2000) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS] (stating "a lawyer who
owes a duty of care must exercise the competence and diligence normally exercised by lawyers
in similar circumstances"); see also In re Discipline ofLaprath, 670 N.W.2d 41, 62 (S.D. 2(03)
(asserting that "mere length of time one is a member of the [State] Bar does not equate with
superior professional skills and competence"); cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 299A
cmt. d (1977) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT OF TORTS] (noting an actor may make it clear that the
actor has less than the minimum skill common to the profession or trade and then is only
required to exercise the skill the actor represents).
2. See, e.g., Lisa G. Lerman, Lying to Clients, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 659, 685 (1990)
(opining that "[slelf-interested deception of clients by lawyers should be prohibited. There is
no justification for allowing lawyers to mislead their clients about their experience or
expertise .... ").
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of conduct differently,3 and arguably, the same will be true with respect to
cases involving the disclosure duties of attorneys. For example, if a lawyer
has handled only one similar matter for another client with moderate success,
whether the lawyer has violated applicable disclosure obligations to another
client may depend upon whether the lawyer (1) says nothing about prior
experience (remains silent), (2) says "I have done good work in this area"
(makes a potentially misleading statement), or (3) says "I have handled many
of these cases" (tells an outright lie).
Second, lawyers owe clients different obligations than nonclients. Clients
are entitled to what might be called "first-class treatment," which means,
among other things, that the lawyer must exercise reasonable care to keep the
client apprised of relevant information. 4 In some, but certainly not all,
contexts, a lawyer owes a client a duty of "absolute and perfect candor."s The
interests of nonclients and potential clients are typically accorded less
protection. 6 Certain rules of tort law, however, impose on attorneys important
obligations to prospective clients or third parties.?
3. See generally RESTATEMENT OF TORTS, supra note 1. § 525 cmt. d (discussing
opinions); id. § 527 (discussing ambiguous representations); id. § 529 (discussing half-truths);
id. § 550 (discussing fraudulent concealment); id. § 551 (discussing liability fornondisclosure);
see also W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS 736-40 (5th ed. 1984)
[hereinafter PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS] (discussing the difference between representation
and nondisclosure).
4. See Vincent R. Johnson, "Absolute and Perfect Candor" to Clients, 34 ST. MARY'S
L.J. 737, 779 (2003) [hereinafter Johnson, Candor] (explaining that within the attorney/client
relationship, the attorney "must place the client's interests above all others").
5. See id. at 792-93 (stating that the duty of "absolute and perfect candor" should be
"limited to situations where the interests of attorney and client are adverse, ... or to the few
areas in which particular rules of conduct call for a high degree of disclosure .... " Otherwise,
the attorney must simply "act reasonably in providing information to the client.").
6. See Ruden v. Jenk, 543 N.W.2d 605, 610 (Iowa 1996) (stating that liability generally
only extends to an attorney's clients); RESTATEMENT OFTHE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS, supra
note I, § 15 (discussing the obligations of an attorney to a client and potential client); see also
One Nat' I Bank v. Antonellis, 80 F.3d 606, 609 (I st Cir. 1996) (stating that "[i]t must be shown
that the attorney should reasonably foresee that the nonclient will rely upon him for legal
services").
7. See, e.g., In re Enron Corp. Sec., Derivative & ERISA Litig., 235 F. Supp. 2d 549, 604
(S.D. Tex. 2002) (indicating that, under Texas law, an attorney may be liable to a nonclient for
fraudulent misrepresentation); Schreiner v. Scoville, 410 N.W.2d 679, 681 (Iowa 1987)
(indicating that an attorney may be held liable to an heir or testamentary beneficiary (nonclient)
when the attorney's error causes a testamentary document to be invalid); Brody v. Ruby, 267
N.W.2d 902. 906 (Iowa 1978) (stating that for an attorney to be liable for legal malpractice, a
third party must be an intended and direct beneficiary of the attorney's services). But see Am.
Centennial Ins. Co. v. Canal Ins. Co., 843 S.W.2d 480, 484 (Tex. 1992) (noting that "Texas
courts have been understandably reluctant to permit a malpractice action by a nonclient because
of the potential interference with the duties an attorney owes to the client").
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Third, disclosure obligations may be imposed under a variety of legal
theories. Some theories defining attorney duties are more demanding than
others. Theories offering the most useful points of reference include deceit
(more commonly called "fraud"), negligent misrepresentation, lack of
informed consent, and breach of fiduciary duty. However, even if a particular
theory of tort liability applies, the obligations that it imposes may be subject
to qualifications or exceptions based on duties owed by the attorney to other
present or former clients. For example, if well-established rules of
professional conduct require a lawyer to keep certain information secret, such
as the amount of a settlement the lawyer secured for another client pursuant
to a confidentiality agreement, other principles of law will not necessitate that
the lawyer reveal that information. "[T]here is never a duty to disclose to one
client what must be held confidential to protect another."s
Finally, in some contexts, the attorney's privacy interests or other important
considerations may trump rules that would otherwise require disclosure of
information about credentials or experience. For example, a lawyer
presumably does not have to disclose to a client a disciplinary sanction in the
nature of a private reprimand. 9 In that situation, there has already been a
judicial or quasi-judicial determination that the public interest is best served
by the reprimand being private, rather than public. IO As a second example,
8. Johnson, Candor, supra note 4, at 787-88. Note, however, that when a lawyer cannot
tell one client material information about another client, there may be a conflict of interest that
will subject the lawyer to ethical obligations, which, if not heeded, may result in disciplinary
and legal liability. [d. at 787 ("In the most extreme case, ethics rules require the lawyer to
decline or withdraw from proposed or existing representation, rather than breach
confidentiality. ").
9. Cf Charles E. Lundberg, Making Private Discipline a Public Matter, BENCH & BAR OF
MINN., Feb. 2003, at 1, available at http://www2.mnbar.orglbenchandbar/2003/feb03/
prof-resp.htm. The article states:
Every year over 100 Minnesota lawyers receive Rule 8(d)(2) private
admonitions - written findings that a disciplinary rule has been violated but that
the violation is isolated and non-serious and therefore the lawyer is privately
admonished. An admonition goes on the lawyer's permanent record, but normally
remains strictly confidential under Rule 20. The lawyer may sometimes have to
disclose the admonition "voluntarily," in the context of a legal malpractke
insurance renewal application, an application for a judgeship or other public
office, etc. But it will normally never become public in the sense of being in the
newspaper.
Id. at 1.
10. But see Benjamin Hoom Barton, Why Do We Regulate Lawyers?: An Economic
Analysis of the Justificationsfor Entry and Conduct Regulation, 33 ARIZ. ST. LJ. 429. 485-86
(2001) ("[LJawyer disciplinary systems should be altered to allow the greatest possible flow of
information to the public .... Disciplinary bodies should make all client complaints a matter of
public record .... Lawyers who have been disciplined should be required to disclose the
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consider the domestic privacy interests of lawyers. Those interests ordinarily
mean an attorney has no duty to disclose to a client marital difficulties that
may affect the lawyer's performance. II
The questions mentioned at the beginning of this Article regarding the
disclosure obligations of attorneys are not theoretical. Malpractice plaintiffs
often allege that their attorneys lacked necessary credentials or experience. 12
It is but a short step from the malpractice allegation of incompetence to a
claim that the lawyer not only lacked proper credentials or experience, but
also failed to disclose or otherwise misrepresented information about those
deficiencies, thereby depriving the client of the opportunity to make an
informed decision in selecting counselor choosing a course of action. Clients
have made precisely those types of misrepresentation claims in recent legal
malpractice cases. 13
discipline to any new customers."); Melvin Hirschman. Private Discipline Comes to an End,
MD. BAR J., May/June 2003, at 58, 58 (indicating that "under [Maryland's] new disciplinary
rules of procedure all reprimands are public").
11. Cf Albany Urology Clinic, P.e. v. Cleveland, 528 S.E.2d 777, 782 n.19 (Ga. 2000)
(suggesting that there is no duty to disclose where a doctor, "the night before receiving patients,
is served with divorce papers").
A lawyer who is having marital difficulties has a duty to act reasonably. In an extreme case,
where the difficulties pose a serious threat to the representation, the lawyer may have a duty to
disclose the risks or withdraw. Cf MODEL RUlES OF PROF'L CONDuer R. 1.16(a)(2) (2002)
(stating that "a lawyer shall not represent a client ... if ... the lawyer's physical or mental
condition materially impairs the lawyer's ability to represent the client"). In addition, a false
statement about marital status may be actionable. See Walter v. Stewart, 67 P.3d 1042, 1048
(Utah Ct. App. 2003) (holding that an attorney's misrepresentation to a former client, with
whom the attorney had a sexual relationship, that he was not married was "material" for
purposes of stating a claim for fraud action against the attorney).
12. See, e.g., Lehrer v. Supkis, No. 01-00-00112-CV, 2002 WL 356394 (Tex. App. Feb.
28, 2002). A former client alleged that an attorney (Supkis) "was not qualified to represent
him" because "Supkis ... had never tried a case involving divorce, breach of fiduciary duty,
fraud, and [Deceptive Trade Practices Act] claims, and he was not board certified in family
law." Id. at *3. In upholding ajury verdict that the attorney was not negligent, the court found
that the former client had failed to "state how Supkis's lack of experience in trying these types
of cases constituted or contributed to an act of negligence." [d.
13. See, e.g., Baker v. Dorfman, 239 F.3d 415 (2d Cir. 2000). In Baker, the trial court
found that the defendant attorney "made and acknowledged" the following misrepresentations:
1. He opened his own practice not in 1991, as he represented to Baker, but
only one month before he met Baker in 1994.
2. The first jury he had selected was that which heard this case against him.
3. He was not even admitted to practice law until 1992.
4. At the time he gave his resume to Baker in 1994, he was not a member of
the New Jersey or Massachusetts bars despite having passed the bar exam in each
of those states.
5. As of 1994, he had not yet represented a single health care organization as
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The difference between allegations of incompetence and misrepresentation
is important. Incompetence ordinarily will not support an action for anything
more than lack of care, which includes actions for negligence (lack of ordinary
care) or recklessness (extreme lack of care). Misrepresentation, in contrast,
may support a claim for intentional fraud,14 and will thus carry with it
advantages, such as the possibility of punitive damages,15 the irrelevance of
their attorney.
6. He had not created the L.L.M. in Health Care Law at NYU, but instead had
met with the dean and designed his own individual course of study.
7. He still has not completed his studies to receive the L.L.M. degree from
NYU.
8. He had not actually taught a course at NYU, but was a tutor.
9. He had not done any work at all for private companies concerning the
Americans with Disabilities Act.
10. The public company for which he had done per diem work was the
Department of Juvenile Justice.
II. He had not done any work in the area of labor relations.
12. The particularly difficult or important cases for which he had served as
special litigation counsel were landlord-tenant cases that he did on a per diem
basis.
13. All of the other cases referenced in his resume were cases in which he
acted on a per diem basis hired by counsel.
Id. at 424 (internal quotations and alterations omitted); see also Griffin v. Fowler, 579 S.E.2d
848 (Ga. Ct. App. 2003) (holding that a former client failed to prove that an attorney
misrepresented his experience and knowledge in estate planning matters); Miller v. Kennedy
& Minshew, P.e., 142 S.W.3d 325 (Tex. App. 2003). In Miller, the plaintiffs claimed that an
attorney, by way of misrepresentations about his expertise, had induced them to engage the firm
to represent their interests in their dispute with the other owners of a small telecommunications
company. Miller, 142 S. W.3d at 331,343. The alleged misrepresentations concerning expertise
may have played a role in the findings against the attorney and the law firm, but the complexity
of the facts, arguments, and appellate opinion make it impossible to say precisely what role, if
any, the alleged misrepresentations had in the decision of the case.
In addition, there have been several recent parallel decisions involving the credentials or
experience of other professionals. See, e.g., Howard v. Univ. of Med. & Dentistry, 800 A.2d
73 (N.J. 2002) (holding that a patient could sue a neurosurgeon on a lack-of-informed-consent
theory, but not for fraud, with respect to alleged misrepresentation of experience and
credentials); Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Commonwealth Fin. Group, 874 F. SUpp.
1345, 1353-54 (S.D. Fla. I 994)(stating that, under the antifraud provisions of the Commodity
Exchange Act, "[mjisrepresentations regarding the trading record and experience of a firm or
broker are fraudulent because past success and experience are material factors which a
reasonable investor would consider when deciding to invest in commodity options").
14. See infra Part II.A (discussing actions for fraud).
15. See Baker, 239 F.3d at 418 (awarding punitive damages against an attorney who
committed resume fraud); Griffin, 579 S.E.2d at 853 (stating that if the plaintiff had proven that
an attorney had fraudulently misrepresented his expertise or experience, the client would have
been entitled to punitive damages as part of his legal malpractice claim); cf McKinnon v.
Tibbetts, 440 A.2d 1028, 1030 (Me. 1982) (holding that although the plaintiff amended a legal
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the contributory negligence defense, 16 the nondischargeability of a judgment
in bankruptcy, 17 and, in some states, a longer statute of limitations 18 and joint
and several liability.19 Also, because misrepresentation often involves a
breach of the duty ofloyalty, it may constitute the type of fiduciary duty claim
that will support forfeiture of attorney fees, even if the client has suffered no
actual damages. 2o
This is important because malpractice plaintiffs
malpractice complaint sounding in negligence to allege fraud, the evidence failed to show that
the attorney acted with malice or wanton and reckless disregard of plaintiff's rights, and
therefore a punitive damages award could not be sustained, even though fraud was proved).
16. Fraud requires proof of intentional or reckless misrepresentation. See infra Part 11.0.1
(discussing the requirement of scienter). If the fraud was intentionally, rather than recklessly
committed, carelessness on the part of the plaintiff will ordinarily not be a defense. See UNIF.
COMPARATIVE FAULT Acr § l(b) (1977) (defining "fault" as "acts or omissions that are in any
measure negligent or reckless" and by implication precluding a comparative-fault defense in
cases where the defendant acts intentionally).
17. See II U.S.c. § 523(a)(2)(A) (2000) (stating that bankruptcy will not discharge a debt
for "money, property, [or] services ... obtained by ... actual fraud").
18. For example, in New York, actions based upon fraud must be commenced within six
years of "the time the plaintiff ... discovered the fraud, or could with reasonable diligence have
discovered it." N.Y. C.P.L.R. 213(8) (McKinney 2003 & Supp. 2004). Other claims are
typically subject to shorter statutes oflimitations. See id. 214(6) (stating that a three-year statute
of limitations applies to "an action to recover damages for malpractice, other than medical,
dental or podiatric malpractice, regardless of whether the underlying theory is based in contract
or tort").
Courts sometimes, however, construe statutes of limitations in ways that negate the
advantages of alleging fraud. See, e.g., Paulos v. Johnson, 597 N.W.2d 316, 320 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1999) (holding that a six-year statute of limitations for fraud actions did not apply to
allegations that a physician fraudulently solicited plaintiff's business because allegations were
"supported by evidence directly connected to ... [the physician's] examination, diagnosis,
treatment and care" of the plaintiff, and were therefore subject to the shorter statute of
limitations applicable to medical malpractice actions).
19. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 604.02(1 )(3)(West 2000 & Supp. 2004)(providing that
"a person who commits an intentional tort" is "jointly and severally liable for the whole
award").
20. See Burrow v. Arce, 997 S.W.2d 229,240 (Tex. 1999) (holding that attorney's breach
of duty of loyalty to client may justify forfeiture of attorney's fee without proof of actual
damages); see also RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW GoVERNING LAWYERS, supra note I, § 37
(providing that "[a] lawyer engaging in clear and serious violation of duty to a client may be
required to forfeit some or all of the lawyer's compensation for the matter," depending on "the
gravity and timing of the violation, its willfulness, its effect on the value of the lawyer's work
for the client, any other threatened or actual harm to the client, and the adequacy of other
remedies"); Steve McConnico & Robyn Bigelow, Summary of Recent Developments in Texas
Legal Malpractice Law, 33 ST. MARY'S L.J. 607, 625-35 (2002) (discussing fee forfeiture in
general).
Incompetence ordinarily is only a breach of the duty of care, not a form of disloyalty.
Therefore, in states that condition forfeiture on disloyalty, incompetence usually will not suffice
as the predicatefor forfeiture. See Burrow, 997 S.W.2d at 238 (stating that "the central purpose
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increasingly allege that attorneys' breaches of duty warrant both an award of
damages and forfeiture of attorney fees.
What follows is a brief guide to the feasibility, advantages, and limitations
of alternative theories bearing upon the question of when an attorney is
subject to tort liability for misrepresenting credentials or experience. Part II
discusses claims based on fraud, including liability for failure to disclose facts
basic to a transaction, facts not reasonably discoverable, or facts within the
scope of a fiduciary relationship. Part II also addresses liability under fraud
for potentially misleading statements that fall within the categories of halftruth, opinion, puffing, and state of mind. In addition, this part considers
liability based on implicit statements of fact and outright lies and examines
other factors bearing upon the viability of fraud claims, such as the
requirements of scienter, intent to induce reliance, and causation of damage.
Furthermore, Part II addresses special considerations relating to claims by
nonclients and the privacy interests of attorneys.
Part ill discusses claims relating to misrepresentation of credentials or
experience that are rooted in negligence, including actions based on negligent
misrepresentation and lack of informed consent. Finally, Part IV summarizes
the complex state of the law relating to attorney liability for misrepresentation
of credentials or experience.
II. Fraud
A. Silence

It has long been said that "silence is golden." This rule applies in the legal
arena, as in other contexts. In general, there is no duty to disclose information
merely because another person would find that information useful, interesting,
or beneficia1. 21 In the field of torts, the no-duty-to-speak rule is widely
applied,22 particularly in fraud actions. 23 However, the general rule on silence
of the equitable remedy of forfeiture is to protect relationships of trust by discouraging agents'
disloyalty").
2 J. See RICHARD A. EpSTEIN, TORTS 553 (J 999) ("[NJondisclosures are but instances of
nonactionable nonfeasance. Just as D is under no obligation to rescue a stranger from peril, so
too D need not disclose to P any information that might help P to make a firm decision.").
22. See, e.g., Doe v. Associated Press, 331 F.3d 417,421 (4th Cir. 2003) (holding that
reporter had no duty to disclose his intent to disobey judge's instruction to the media not to
disclose the identity of a sexual assault victim, who testified at trial on condition 0f anonymity);
Urman v. S. Boston Sav. Bank, 674 N.E.2d 1078, 1080 (Mass. 1997) (finding that a bank
selling a condominium in a neighborhood that had received a "lot of adverse publicity" had no
duty to disclose that a toxic waste problem had been recently cleaned up at a nearby school);
Levine v. Kramer Group, 807 A.2d 264, 270 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2002) (holding that
builder selling new home had no duty to disclose that a hostile neighbor had raised threatening
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is subject to several important exceptions. At least three of these exceptions
are relevant to whether an attorney has a duty to disclose unfavorable
information about the attorney's credentials or experience. 24 The first
exception concerns facts "basic to the transaction";25 the second exception
concerns facts "not reasonably discoverable";26 and the third exception
concerns facts "within the scope of a fiduciary relationship."27 In all
situations, attorneys' disclosure obligations are limited by a variety of
considerations, including scope of representation, materiality, client
knowledge, competing obligations to others, client consent, and threatened
harm to the client or others. 28 Regardless of the theory for imposing a duty of
disclosure, these considerations may limit the obligations of attorneys.
I. Facts Basic to the Transaction

According to the Restatement (Second) o/Torts, there is a duty to disclose
facts "basic to the transaction," the nondisclosure of which is tantamount to
deliberate victimization. 29 In discussing this exception, the Restatement
and abusive objections to the house as an "abominable monolith").
23. Courts differ somewhat in their articulation of the elements of fraud. Compare Area
Landscaping, L.L.c. v. Glaxo-Wellcome, Inc., 586 S.E.2d 507, 512 (N.C. Ct. App. 2003)
(naming the elements offraud as "(I) false representation or concealment of a material fact, (2)
reasonably calculated to deceive, (3) made with the intent to deceive, (4) which does in fact
deceive, (5) resulting in damage to the injured party"), with Robbins v. Capozzi, 100 S.W.3d
18, 23 (Tex. App. 2002) (holding that claimant must prove "(I) a material representation was
made, (2) the representation was false, (3) when the representation was made, the speaker knew
it was false or made the statement recklessly without any knowledge of truth and as a positive
assertion, (4) the representation was made with the intention that it be acted upon by the other
party, (5) that party acted in reliance upon the representation, and (6) that party suffered
injury").
24. There are other exceptions that may create a duty to speak in cases involving attorneys
and clients. For example, there is a duty to update previous statements when new information
makes them untrue or misleading. See McMahan v. Greenwood, 108 S.W.3d 467, 494 (Tex.
App. 2003) (stating that even if an attorney was representing only persons other than the
plaintiff when he allegedly made certain statements, or when he later allegedly failed to disclose
the falsity of the statements during negotiations, he was still under a duty to disclose the entire
truth and to correct any misimpressions caused by his earlier statements); 2 FOWI.ER V. HARPER
ET AL., THE LAW OF TORTS § 7.14, at 476 (2d ed. 1986).
25. See infra Part Il.A.I.
26. See infra Part Il.A.2.
27. See infra Part II.A.3.
28. See Johnson, Candor, supra note 4, at 778-92.
29. The provision states in relevant part:
(2) One party to a business transaction is under a duty to exercise reasonable
care to disclose to the other before the transaction is consummated,
(e) facts basic to the transaction, if he knows that the other is about to enter
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commentary explains:
There are situations in which the defendant not only knows that his
bargaining adversary is acting under a mistake basic to the
transaction, but also knows that the adversary, by reason of the
relation between them, the customs of the trade or other objective
circumstances, is reasonably relying upon a disclosure of the
unrevealed fact if it exists. In this type of case good faith and fair
dealing may require a disclosure.
It is extremely difficult to be specific as to the factors that give
rise to this known, and reasonable, expectation of disclosure. In
general, the cases in which the rule ... has been applied have been
those in which the advantage taken of the plaintiff s ignorance is
so shocking to the ethical sense of the community, and is so
extreme and unfair, as to amount to a form of swindling, in which
the plaintiff is led by appearances into a bargain that is a trap, of
whose essence and substance he is unaware. 30
The facts-basic-to-the-transaction exception is narrow,31 and only in the
rarest of cases involving an attorney and client or prospective client will the
standard be met. However, in extreme situations, such as where a lawyer fails
to disclose that he is presently suspended from the practice of law,32 under
into it under a mistake as to them, and that the other, because of the relationship
between them, the customs of the trade or other objective circumstances, would
reasonably expect a disclosure of those facts.
Comment I adds:
Thus a seller who knows that his cattle are infected with tick fever ... is not free
to unload them on the buyer and take his money, when he knows that the buyer
is unaware of the fact [and] could not easily discover it.
RESTATEMENT OF TORTS, supra note I, § 551 & cmt t.
30. Jd.

31. Compare Stambovsky v. Ackley, 572 N.Y.S.2d 672, 674 (N.Y. App. Div. 1991)
(allowing rescission where vendor of a house, who had informed the media about the existence
of poltergeists, failed to disclose the dwelling's reputation as a haunted house to a nonlocal
buyer because "[t]he impact of the reputation thus created goes to the very essence of the
bargain between the parties, greatly impairing both the value of the property and its potential
for resale"), with Lithuanian Commerce Corp. v. Sara Lee Hosiery, 179 F.R.D. 450, 478 (D.
N.J. 1998) (holding that manufacturer's failure to disclose to a distributor negative opinions
from a marketing survey was not "so shocking to the ethical sense ofthe community, [or] so
extreme and unfair, as to amount to a form of swindling" that would support an action for
fraud).
32. See, e.g., Boston Univ. v. Univ. of Med. & Dentistry of N.J., 820 A.2d 1230,1230-33
(N.J. 2003) (holding that New Jersey attorneys who are not in good standing in the state may
not rely on their good standing in other states, but must disclose their status in New Jersey,
when seeking to appear pro hac vice); Attorney Grievance Comm' n of Md. v. Brennan, 714
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indictment, or addicted to illegal drugs,33 nondisclosure by an attorney may
involve facts so basic to the transaction as to impose a duty to speak under the
terms of the Restatement rule.
2. Facts Not Reasonably Discoverable
Many tort cases hold that persons have a duty to disclose material facts that
are not reasonably discoverable. 34 This is true even if the facts are not so
important as to qualify as basic to the transaction. 35 The facts need only be
material and not discoverable through the exercise of reasonable care.
Materiality simply means that the matter is such that it would be given
weight in the plaintiff s decision-making process. 36 However, the matter need
A.2d 157, 162-63 (Md. 1997) (holding that a licensed attorney violated the ethics rules by
assisting a suspended attorney who failed to disclose his suspension to clients); In re Devers,
974 P.2d 191, 196 (Or. 1999) (holding that an attorney's failure to disclose his suspension to
opposing counsel violated ethical rules); In re Whipple, 886 P.2d 7, 13 (Or. 1994) (holding that
an attorney's intentional failure to disclose his suspension when communicating with clients
about a probate matter was a misrepresentation of a material fact for purposes of the ethics
rules). But see United States v. Maria-Martinez, 143 F.3d 914, 916 (5th Cir. 1998) (holding that
representing a defendant after being barred from practice does not necessarily compel a finding
of ineffective assistance of counsel).
33. But see Albany Urology Clinic, P.e. v. Cleveland, 528 S.E.2d 777, 778 (Ga. 2000)
(holding that a physician had no duty under either common law or the state informed consent
statute to disclose his drug use); Kaskie v. Wright, 589 A.2d 213, 215 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991)
(holding that failure to inform parents that their child's surgeon was an alcoholic and unlicensed
did not constitute fraudulent concealment that would estop the defendants from asserting a
statute of limitations defense); see also Hidding v. Williams, 578 So. 2d 1192 (La. Ct. App.
1991) (holding that a physician's failure to inform patients of his chronic alcohol abuse violated
informed consent requirements).
34. See, e.g., Busch Oil Co. v. Amoco Oil Co., No. 5:94CVI75, 1996 WL33143114 (W.D.
Mich. Feb. 20, 1996); Timrn v. Clement, 574 N.W.2d 368 (Iowa Ct. App. 1997); Holcomb v.
Zinke, 365 N.W.2d 507 (N.D. 1985); Quashnock v. Frost, 445 A.2d 121 (Pa. 1982); Mitchell
v. Christensen, 31 P.3d 572 (Utah 2001).
35. See supra Part I1.A.I. The rule regarding facts "basic to the transaction" is a narrower
concept than that of materiality. HARPER ET AL., supra note 24, § 7.14, at 476.
36. See RESTATEMENT OF TORTS, supra note I, § 538 (providing that a matter is material
if "a reasonable man would attach importance to its existence or nonexistence in determining
his choice of action" or "the maker of the representation knows or has reason to know that its
recipient regards or is likely to regard the matter as important in determining his choice of
action, although a reasonable man would not so regard it"); see also Spector v. Mermelstein,
361 F. Supp. 30, 40 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), modified on other grounds, 485 F.2d 474 (2d Cir. 1973)
(defining "material facts" as those "which, if known to the client, might well have caused him,
acting as a reasonable man, to alter his proposed course of conduct"); Robbins v. Capozzi, 100
S.W.3d 18,24 (Tex. App. 2002) (defining as "material" information that "a reasonable person
would attach importance to and would be induced to act on ... in determining his choice of
actions in the transaction in question"); Lerman, supra note 2, at 686 (stating that while the
materiality standard often requires disclosure of additional information to clients, "the
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not be the sole or predominant factor in the plaintiff s decision. 37 In many cases,
materiality is a question of fact for the jury; in others, it is a question of law for
the court. 38 Whether a lawyer, twenty years ago, earned a low grade in a law
school course dealing with the subject matter of the representation may be
immaterial as a matter of law. Whether a newly minted lawyer with no other
relevant experience recently failed the pertinent law school course might raise
a fact question as to materiality.39
The exception to the general rule of nondisclosure for facts "not reasonably
discoverable" may be justified on public policy grounds. Ordinarily there is no
duty to speak because a rule countenancing nondisclosure creates an incentive
for persons to actively protect their own interests. Individuals cannot stand idly
by waiting for others to inform them of everything they need to know. Rather,
under the general rule, the individual bears the risk of loss: one who fails to
gather and properly evaluate relevant facts before making a decision risks the
consequences of making a bad choice. The person who neglects to act diligently
loses. Thus, "[t]he individualism of the common law requires each person to
live, or die, by his own wits."4O The general rule permitting nondisclosure
furthers the law's interest in discouraging the waste of talent and resources. 4 !
materiality test is not overinclusive; it exempts lawyers from having to disclose a great deal of
nonessential information").
37. Some scholars suggest that the materiality standard requires a great deal in the way of
disclosure:
The question is whether the information might cause a reasonable client to
alter her conduct.
This "materiality" standard of disclosure appears to require additional
disclosures in most of the categories of deception .... If the lawyer discloses her
lack of experience in the area of law in which a client needs service, ... the client
might choose to retain another lawyer.
Lerman, supra note 2, at 686.
38. Cf Scott v. Bradford, 606 P.2d 554, 557-58 (Okla. 1979) (holding in a medical
malpractice case involving the informed consent doctrine that "[tlhere is no bright line
separating the material from the immaterial; it is a question of fact. A risk is material ifit would
be likely to affect patient's decision. When non-disclosure of a particular risk is open to debate,
the issue is for the finder of facts.").
39. See generally Linda Morton, Finding a Suitable Lawyer: Why Consumers Can't Always
Get What They Want and What the Legal Profession Should Do About It, 25 V.c. DAVIS L.
REV. 283 (1992) (discussing the ways in which consumers measure "quality"). With respect
to attorney credentials and experience, the article discusses client preferences relating to matters
such as what law school an attorney attended, whether the attorney served on law review, the
attorney's number of years in practice, and the attorney's win-loss record. Jd. at 288-89.
40. EpSTEIN, supra note 21, at 553.
41. VINCENTR. JOHNSON & ALAN GUNN, STUDIES IN AMERICAN TORT LAW 9 (3ded. 2005)
("[T]ort law should encourage individuals to employ available resources to protect their own
interests, rather than depend upon others to save them from harm. Many would argue that this
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The exception concerning facts not reasonably discoverable recognizes the
limits of the general rule that ordinarily permits nondisclosure. If facts are not
discoverable, it is futile to place the burden of discovery on the plaintiff. The
plaintiff will simply be relegated to making a potentially bad decision without
access to material information. 42
Moreover, extending the exception to cases where facts, though discoverable
through great efforts, are not reasonably discoverable, avoids forcing laypersons
to hire numerous experts to assist them in their decisions. 43 Consequently, one
court stated:
Where one party to a contract has ... knowledge which is not within
the fair and reasonable reach of the other party and which he could
not discover by the exercise of reasonable diligence ... he is under
a real obligation to speak, and his silence constitutes fraud. 44
Many of the cases relating to this excepti0f1 have involved the sale or lease
of real property.45 There is no apparent reason, however, why courts should
limit the rule to real estate. 46 In terms of importance, engaging counsel to handle
a legal matter may rank as high as, if not higher than, the transfer of an interest
policy has been on the wane in recent years .... Yet, the continued vitality of the anti-waste or
self-protection principle can be seen in various areas of the law .... There is a continuous
struggle to define how much one must do for oneself, and how much one can expect from
others.").
42. See Stambovsky v. Ackley, 572 N.Y.S.2d 672, 676 (N.Y. App. Div. 1991) ("Where a
condition which has been created by the seller materially impairs the value of the contract and
is peculiarly within the knowledge of the seller or unlikely to be discovered by a prudent
purchaser exercising due care with respect to the subject transaction, nondisclosure constitutes
a basis for rescission as a matter of equity. Any other outcome places upon the buyer not merely
the obligation to exercise care in his purchase but rather to be omniscient with respect to any
fact which may affect the bargain. No practical purpose is served by imposing such a burden
upon a purchaser. To the contrary, it encourages predatory business practice and offends the
principle that equity will suffer no wrong to be without a remedy.").
43. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Christensen, 31 P.3d 572. 575 (Utah 2001).
44. Wolfv. Brungardt, 524 P.2d 726.734 (Kan. 1974).
45. See, e.g., Robbins v. Capozzi, 100 S.W.3d 18.24 (Tex. App. 2002) (holding that the
vendor of a condominium did not have a duty to disclose problems that the vendor's daughter
had encountered when attempting to park her car in the garage because the purchaser could have
discovered, by attempting to park there herself, that her vehicle was too large for the allotted
space).
46. A related rule - the "peculiar knowledge" doctrine - has been held to apply in other
situations. "The 'peculiar knowledge' doctrine relates to the reasonableness of claims of
reliance, finding its theoretical basis in the premise that when matters are peculiarly within the
defendant's knowledge, plaintiff may rely without prosecuting an investigation, as he has no
independent means of ascertaining the truth." Unicredito Italiano SPA v. J.P. Morgan Chase
Bank. 288 F. Supp. 2d 485. 499 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (internal quotations and alterations omitted).
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in land. If persons selling or leasing property must disclose important facts that
are not reasonably discoverable, attorneys should be unable to sell legal services
without disclosing material facts that are not reasonably discoverable.
Consider how the exception for facts not reasonably discoverable might be
applied to the context of lawyers and clients. Does a fact qualify as "not
reasonably discoverable" if a reasonable client would not think to ask about it?
In the real estate context, one court determined that "the proper standard is
whether the defect would be apparent to ordinary prudent persons with like
experience, not to persons with specialized knowledge."47 One may reasonably
argue that the same standard should apply to matters relating to legal
representation.
Presumably, if an undisclosed matter relating to an attorney's credentials or
experience obviously is connected to the subject matter of the representation,
that matter should qualify as reasonably discoverable through inquiry, and
disclosure should not be required. For example, a client can always ask, "Have
you ever handled this kind of case before?" This type of logical question
involves information that is reasonably discoverable. There will, of course, be
difficult cases relating to whether information about credentials or experience
should be disclosed. For example, has professional malpractice become such a
part of public consciousness that a client is obliged to ask a lawyer "have you
been sued for malpractice?" Or is malpractice still so uncommon that the
reasonable prudent client would not think or have the courage to inquire? There
is no easy answer to these questions. 48
Most clients do not ask - and, indeed, do not think to ask - whether an
attorney has ever been disbarred, reprimanded, or suspended from practice. Yet,
such information about a lawyer's disciplinary history is often easily
discoverable. In Texas, for example, anyone can go to the State Bar website for
information about any of the more than 70,000 Texas attorneys,49 including
public disciplinary sanctions in Texas and other states. 50 Similarly, the Internet
47. Mitchell, 31 P.3d at 575.
48. In other contexts, courts have sometimes been reluctant to hold that the risk of being
sued for malpractice was foreseeable. See Westport Ins. Corp. v. Lilley, 292 F. Supp. 2d 165,
172 (D. Me. 2003) (holding that a future malpractice claim against an insured law firm was not
foreseeable at the time of an inconclusive and confusing jury verdict and therefore the policy's
prior-knowledge exclusion was inapplicable).
49. See TexasBar.com, at http://www.texasbar.com (last visited Jan. 18,2005).
50. Some persons doubt the usefulness of this approach. While this article was being
written, a wen known law professor wrote a message to the listserv for the Association of
Professional Responsibility Lawyers with regard to disclosure of malpractice insurance
coverage, which stated:
If the idea is to get the information into the hands of potential clients (for whatever
they decide it's worth), then having the information available on a Supreme Court
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provides an increasing amount of information about persons who commit
criminal conduct. 51 It can be argued that such information, if it is free or
available at a nominal cost, is reasonably discoverable, and therefore the
exception for facts not reasonably discoverable should not impose a duty to
speak.
Other types of information are harder to obtain. For example, it may be
difficult for a client to determine whether an attorney has been subject to courtimposed sanctions that are not readily discoverable through computer-based
technology, such as sanctions imposed by a trial court that did not result in a
reported decision. The law should not require clients to take burdensome steps
to learn unusual information about an attorney that materially bears upon the
representation. 52 There is, however, value to reading narrowly the exception for
facts not reasonably discoverable. Clients should be encouraged to ask good
questions of their attorneys and gather information to protect their own interests.
Presently, too few cases exist dealing with lawyer-client disclosure issues to be
able to predict with confidence the scope of the exception for facts that are not
reasonably discoverable.
3. Facts Within the Scope of a Fiduciary Relationship
A fiduciary has a duty to disclose relevant information to a beneficiary
because the fiduciary relationship of trust and confidence imposes a duty to
speak. 53 Attorney-client relationships are fiduciary as a matter of law. 54
website seems like a good way of hiding it, not making it readily accessible.
(What is the budget going to be for publicizing this web address? What
percentage of consumers who need this information are computer-literate?)
E-mail from W. William Hodes, Professor Emeritus, Indiana University School of Law,
Indianapolis, to listserv of the Association of Professional Responsibility Lawyers (Aug. 10,
2004) (on file with the authors) (used with permission of Professor Hodes).
51. See, e.g., Net Detective, at http://www.btinternet.coml-chris.heatonldetective/criminalrecord-check.htm (last visited Oct. 3, 2004) (offering searches on "criminal and prison records,"
"marriage, property and adoption records," "law suits, court orders and alimony," inter alia, at
a cost of$29.00 for three years of unlimited searches). But see Lynn Peterson, Navigating the
Maze of Criminal Records Retrieval - Updated, at http://records.4mg.comlcriminal.htm (last
visited Oct. 3, 2004) (stating that "[t]here is no such thing as a national criminal records
check"); Internet for Lawyers - Criminal Records, at http://www.netforlawyers.comlarticle_
public_records_03.htm (last visited Oct. 3,2004) (explaining what records are available).
52. Cf Queen v. Lambert, 577 S.E.2d 72, 74 (Ga. Ct. App. 2003) (opining that the
existence of "a confidential relationship imposes a greater duty on the parties to reveal what
should be revealed and a lessened duty to discover independently what could have been
discovered through the exercise of ordinary care").
53. See EPSTEIN, supra note 21, at 553.
54. See Keywell Corp. v. Piper & Marbury, L.L.P., No. 96-CV-0660E(SC), 1999 WL
66700, at *4 (W.D.N.Y. Feb. 11,1999).
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Accordingly, it is reasonable to ask whether an attorney's nondisclosure of
unfavorable infonnation about his credentials or experience will support an
action for fraud because of the fiduciary nature of the relationship, which
requires a lawyer to speak. Indeed, of the three main theories for imposing a
(1) facts basic to the transaction,55 (2) facts not reasonably
duty to speak
discoverable,56 and (3) facts within the scope of a fiduciary relationship - the
fiduciary-relationship exception is the most troublesome because it is potentially
the most wide-ranging. Consequently, courts should exercise great care in
interpreting the meaning of this exception. The question is to what extent this
exception requires an attorney to disclose adverse facts about credentials or
experience, even if those facts are not basic to the transaction or are reasonably
discoverable by the client.
Some courts have said that attorneys owe clients a duty of "absolute and
perfect candor."57 The phrase "absolute and perfect candor," however, is an
overstatement of an attorney's disclosure obligations, for in many contexts the
law imposes no more than a duty of reasonable care to keep a client infonned of
relevant matters. 58 Still, where the interests of the lawyer and client clearly are
the
adverse - as in the case of a business transaction between the two
attorney's duty is essentially one of absolute and perfect candor. 59
A fiduciary never has a duty to reveal immaterial information,60 or
information that is unreliable61 or already known to the beneficiary.62 Assuming
55. See supra Part II.A.1.
56. See supra Part II.A.2.
57. See Johnson, Candor, supra note 4, at 753-70 (discussing recent cases from Texas,
California, Oklahoma, and the District of Columbia).
58. [d. at 775-76 (stating that "non negligent failure to furnish information to a client" will
not ordinarily give rise to civil liability).
59. See Holland v. Brown, 66 S.W.2d 1095, 1102 (Tex. App. 1933) (stating that "[tJhe
failure of an attorney dealing with his client to disclose to him the material facts and the legal
consequences flowing from the facts constitutes actionable fraud"); see also Cummings v. Sea
Lion Corp., 924 P.2d 10 II, 1021 (Alaska 1996) (finding an attorney liable for fiduciary fraud
for failing to disclose to client corporation that the attorney would only be paid if the transaction
between the corporation and a previous client was successful); Johnson, Candor, supra note 4,
at 770-78 ("Judicial decisions irrefutably establish that business transactions between lawyer
and client are presumptively fraudulent. Such dealings will not survive scrutiny unless the
lawyer proves that the highest standards of disclosure and fair dealing were observed .... In
such cases ... it is accurate to say that attorneys have a duty of 'absolute and perfect candor. ''').
60. See, e.g., STAR Ctrs., Inc. v. Faegre & Benson, L.L.P., 644 N.W.2d 72 (Minn. 2002)
(holding that a law firm did not breach its fiduciary duties by failing to disclose immaterial
information).
61. See Johnson, Candor, supra note 4, at 783 (noting that "[uJnreliable information is one
type of information that may be found to lack materiality").
62. See id. at 785-87 (recognizing that "little would be gained by mandating disclosure of
information already possessed by the client").
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that none of these limits apply, suppose, for example, that a client is unaware
that an attorney has never handled a case of the type for which the client wishes
to engage representation. The absence of prior experience is not unreliable
because it is a fact known with certainty to the lawyer. The fact is not known
to the client. And, the matter is material because even though it might not be the
decisive consideration, it would logically be given some weight during the
client's selection of counsel. Must the lawyer disclose to the client the lack of
prior experience because there is a fiduciary duty to speak?
Conventional wisdom would say that there is no fiduciary duty to disclose
adverse information about lack of experience before the attorney-client
relationship comes into existence. 63 Until that moment, the lawyer does not owe
a prospective client the full range of fiduciary duties that are owed to clients.64
The lawyer, however, arguably cannot continue to be silent regarding the
adverse facts once entering into a relationship with a client. While some may
argue that it is too late to require disclosure of the adverse information because
the client has already hired the lawyer, this cannot be true for several reasons.
First, a client may discharge an attorney at any time, with or without cause,65
subject to liability for unpaid attorney's fees. 66 The lawyer's nondisclosure of
information about lack of experience bears on the client's exercise of the right
to terminate the engagement. Second, the interests of the lawyer and client are
arguably adverse - the lawyer would like the relationship to continue, but the
client, upon learning of the lawyer's lack of experience or credentials, might
prefer to terminate it. In this situation does the law impose a duty of "absolute
and perfect candor," the violation of which will subject the lawyer to liability for
fraud?
A mechanical reading of fiduciary duty law might lead to the conclusion that
disclosure of the lack of experience is required. Yet common sense dictates a
contrary result. It would be absurd to permit a lawyer to not disclose
unfavorable information before signing a client, but then require the lawyer to
reveal the information immediately thereafter. Once the attorney-client
relationship has come into existence, the lawyer should be focused on making
the relationship work, rather than on revealing prior adverse information that
63. A potential client inquiring about legal services does not qualify as a client until the
lawyer consents to provide legal services or knows or should know that the potential client is
relying on the lawyer to provide legal services. RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW GOVERNING
LAWYERS, supra note I, § 14(1).
64. Id. § 15 cmt. b (stating that "prospective clients should receive some but not all of the
protection afforded clients").
65. /d. § 32; see also CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS § 9.5.2, at 545
( 1986) ("It is now uniformly recognized that the client-lawyer contract is terminable at will by
the cI ient. ").
66. See RESTATEMENTOFTHE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS, supra note I, § 40.
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might undo the relationship or make it less productive. The attorney's fiduciary
obligation should be to work as hard as possible to ensure that the representation
is successful, rather than to reveal negative past infonnation that might induce
"buyer's remorse."
Courts should hold that if silence about unfavorable credentials or experience
was proper before the commencement of the relationship because the facts were
not basic to the transaction67 or were reasonably discoverable,68 continued
silence after the relationship begins is ordinarily also acceptable. Thus, the
focus concerning past infonnation relating to credentials and experience should
be on whether the attorney acted properly in terms of what was said before the
initiation of the relationship. This approach is reasonable, provided that no new
developments in the representation directly call for disclosure of past facts, such
as a request by the client for infonnation relating to the subject. 69
Fiduciary duty law largely falls within the competence of the courts. Absent
legislative restrictions, courts are free to shape that body of law in a manner that
is likely to be most conducive to the common good. 70 The recommended rule
would promote stability in lawyer-client relationships and would also minimize
the risk that the slightest failure to disclose adverse infonnation, which there was
originally no duty to reveal, might be inflated into the predicate for a malpractice
action or a request for fee forfeiture. Lawyers would still remain subject to
liability for failure to disclose facts basic to the transaction 7l and facts not

67. See supra Part ILA.I.
68. See supra Part ILA.2.
69. There may be circumstances short of a direct request that call for disclosure. For
example, suppose that a client relates to the lawyer a story in the newspaper about 2.n attorney
who was sanctioned for abusive litigation tactics, and then says, "I sure would not want to be
represented by ajerk like that." If the client's lawyer has been subject to similar sanctions, the
lawyer has a duty to disclose those facts to correct the client's known misimpression about a
material subject. See supra note 24.
70. In shaping the law of legal malpractice, courts have departed from well-established
principles where it was sensible to do so. In McPeake v. William T. Cannon. Esq.• 553 A.2d
439 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989), an attorney was sued for malpractice after representing a criminal
client who jumped to his death from the courthouse window when his guilty verdict was
returned. The suicide was foreseeable because the client had previously threatened to kill
himself and thus, under ordinary principles of proximate causation, the client's death was legally
caused by the attorney's alleged negligence. Id. at 442. However, the court determined that the
attorney could not be held liable even if the lawyer's negligence had precipitated the suicide
because to impose such a risk would discourage attorneys from representing "a sizeable number
of depressed or unstable criminal defendants," and defeat the important goal of making legal
counsel available to those who need it. Id. at 443.
71. See supra Part II.A.I (discussing the duty to disclose facts "basic to the transaction").
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reasonably discoverable,72 and, as discussed below, for false 73 and misleading74
statements, failure to obtain informed consent,75 and negligent
misrepresentation. 76
The recommended rule would require a lawyer to provide prior information
about credentials and experience when that information is requested or directly
relevant to the representation. This is true because lawyers are under a broadly
applicable obligation to act reasonably in practicing law. Lawyers must respond
to legitimate requests for information and must keep clients reasonably informed
about relevant matters. 77 Beyond this duty of reasonable care,78 courts should
not blindly impose a duty of absolute and perfect candor on attorneys to relate
information about credentials or experience. A client who hires an attorney has
no legitimate expectation that the attorney will divulge every unfavorable fact
relating to the attorney's credentials or experience. Rather, one expects an
attorney to disclose what is important, to overlook what is not, and to exercise
reasonable judgment in between. Client expectations are important because
"[t]he crucial element in determining whether a duty of disclosure exists is
whether the mistaken party would reasonably expect disclosure."79
Furthermore, a rule imposing a duty of absolute and perfect candor with
regard to disclosure of an attorney's credentials and experience would set an
unattainable standard. Lawyers might never finish reciting the dullest passages
of their personal histories if the law required "absolute and perfect" disclosure
of information about credentials or experience. so In addition, the important
disclosures would be lost amidst the tide of other less-useful information.
Finally, little would be gained, from the standpoint of imposing legal liability,
by requiring disclosure of facts so old, unreliable, minor, or immaterial that
reasonable care would not call for their disclosure. In the end, a plaintiff

72. See supra Part II.A.2 (discussing the duty to disclose facts that are "not reasonably
discoverable").
73. See infra Part II.C (discussing liability for outright lies).
74. See infra Part II.B (discussing liability for potentially misleading statements).
75. See infra Part I1I.B (discussing liability for failure to obtain informed consent).
76. See infra Part III.A (discussing liability for negligent misrepresentation).
77. See RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS. supra note 1. § 20.
78. For a fairly characteristic explanation of the disclosure obligations that the law of
negligence imposes on lawyers. see Sierra Fria Corp. v. Donald 1. Evans, P.e., 127 F.3d 175.
179-82 (I st Cir. 1997).
79. Fleming Cos. v. Krist Oil Co .• 324 F. Supp. 2d 933. 946 (W.D. Wis. 2004) (quoting
Hennig v. Ahearn. 601 N.W.2d 14.22 (Wis. Ct. App. 1999».
80. But see Lerman. supra note 2. at 683 ("[Ilf lawyers were more candid about the extent
of their experience and about their own judgment that they could handle work in a new area, the
flow of business into the law firms might largely be unaffected. The lawyers might
communicate confidence in their own abilities without lying about their expertise.").
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alleging fraud or claims based on negligence must prove that the
misrepresentation caused reliance and damage. 81 That will be difficult or
impossible to show if the facts relating to credentials or experience are so slight
that reasonable care would not call for revelation. Similarly, nondisclosure of
such facts will rarely support a claim for fee forfeiture because that remedy is
normally available only where a breach of fiduciary obligations is a "clear and
serious violation of a duty.,,82
The course recommended here for imposing disclosure obligations is
consistent with decided cases. In a number of instances, courts have been
reluctant to require professionals to disclose facts about their personal lives or
information about credentials. A Georgia case, for example, held that a
physician did not have a duty to disclose his drug-use problems to a patient. 83
In a case in Hawaii,84 a doctor's failure to disclose that he was not a board

81. See infra Part n.D.2.
82. RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS, supra note 1, § 37.
83. See Albany Urology Clinic, P.e. v. Cleveland, 528 S.E.2d 777 (Ga. 2000). The
Cleveland court found "compelling public policy reasons that militate against creating an
independent cause of action for ... a professional's failure to disclose life factors that might be
detrimental to the rendering of services to patients or c1ients[, including] the impossibility of
defining which of a professional's life factors would be subject to such a disclosure
requirement." Id. at 781-82. The court compared the situation in Cleveland to a hypothetical
situation involving an attorney:
Consider an attorney who, on most nights, drinks between four and five
glasses of wine between the time he arrives home from work and the time he
retires for the evening. He is never intoxicated or hung over at work, and he never
misses or is late for a work-related event. No one has ever suggested to him, and
he does not suspect, that his wine drinking affects his professional performance.
However, his doctor informs him that he may be a "binge drinker," and may have
a drinking problem .. " Having been so informed, does the attorney have an
affirmative duty to disclose this life factor - a diagnosed drinking problem which
conceivably could affect his professional performance - to every current and
prospective client? If so, does his failure to make such disclosure create a cause
of action against him regardless of whether his work is competently performed?
What if the lawyer is aware that his client is opposed to the drinking of alcohol on
moral or religious grounds, does that create a heightened duty of disclosure on the
lawyer's part with regard to that particular client?
[d. at 782 n.19. These questions, the court found, illustrate "the uncertainty that would ensue"
from a decision requiring disclosure of life factors. [d. However, the court may have reached
the wrong decision. The facts in Cleveland were egregious. The patient alleged that the
defendant doctor fraudulently concealed his illegal cocaine use and resulting impairment and
"negligently performed unnecessary surgery for non-existent penile cancer." [d. at 778-79. An
argument can be made that the exercise of reasonable care in this case required disclosure by
the doctor of his illegal drug use.
84. See Ditto v. McCurdy, 947 P.2d 952 (Haw. 1997).
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certified plastic surgeon was held not to be a breach of fiduciary duty. 85 These
cases from the medical field reinforce the conclusion that courts should act
carefully when defining the disclosure obligations of attorneys. A lawyer
should be required to reveal adverse facts relating to credentials or experience
only when a fiduciary is reasonably expected to reveal those facts or special
circumstances make those facts directly relevant to the representation.
B. Potentially Misleading Statements
1. Half-Truths

Although there may be no duty to speak on the subject of credentials and
experience, an attorney who elects to do so must be mindful of the rule on halftruthS. 86 A story cannot be told in such a way that it is so incomplete that it
poses a grave risk of misleading the listener. 87 This rule applies with particular
force to attorneys. Thus, one court stated:
A person must be able to trust a lawyer's word as the lawyer should
expect his word to be understood, without having to search for
equivocation, hidden meanings, deliberate half-truths or
camouflaged escape hatches. 88
85. The doctor was "certified as, and held himself out to be, an otolaryngologist, facial
surgeon, and cosmetic surgeon" and "made no active representations to the contrary, nor did he
conceal his qualifications." ld. at 958. The court stated that "[u]nder the circumstances" the
physician had no affirmative duty to disclose his qualifications or lack thereof to the patient.
Id. The court further concluded that because the jury instructions said that the doctor had "an
affirmative duty to exercise the utmost good faith, integrity, fairness, and fidelity, and to disclose
material facts to the patient regarding the doctor's qualifications to perform the procedures
contemplated by the patient," the jury instructions were erroneous. Id. at 959.
86. See RESTATEMENT OF TORTS, supra note I, § 529 (providing that "[a] representation
stating the truth so far as it goes but which the maker knows or believes to be materially
misleading because of his failure to state additional or qualifying matter is a fraudulent
misrepresentation"); see also Meade v. Cedarapids, Inc., 164 F.3d 1218, 1222 (9th Cir. 1999)
(quoting Gregory v. Novak, 855 P.2d 1142, 1144 (Or. Ct. App. 1993), for the proposition that
"[ 0 Jne who makes a representation that is misleading because it is in the nature of a half-truth
assumes the obligation to make a full and fair disclosure of the whole truth") (internal
quotations and alterations omitted); In re Greene, 620 P.2d 1379, 1383 (Or. 1980); Morales v.
Morales, 98 S.W.3d 343, 347 (Tex. App. 2003) (stating "when one voluntarily discloses
information, he has a duty to disclose the whole truth rather than making a partial disclosure that
conveys a false impression").
87. "[OJne who voluntarily elects to make a partial disclosure is deemed to have assumed
a duty to tell the whole truth ... even though the speaker was under no duty to make the partial
disclosure in the first place." Union Pac. Res. Group, Inc. v. Rhone-Poulenc, Inc., 247 F.3d
574,584 (5th Cir. 2001).
88. III re Conduct of Hiller, 694 P.2d 540, 544 (Or. 1985) (holding that an attorney who
stated that property had been sold, but fai led to disclose the pro forma character of the transfer,

550

OKLAHOMA LA W REVIEW

lVol. 57:529

For example, a lawyer cannot state that she was awarded a degree by a
university, without mentioning that the degree was later revoked;89 that she is
licensed to practice law, without saying that she is now on inactive status;90 or
that she applied for board certification as a specialist, without indicating that her
application was rejected. 91
However, something is not a half-truth merely because negative information
of some sort could be revealed about the speaker that has not yet been disclosed.
Rather, a half-truth exists, and additional disclosure is required, only when the
undisclosed facts are so directly related to the initial statement, or so pertinent
to an understanding of the subject, that the recipient of the initial statement
would feel seriously misled about that particular assertion of fact. 92 This nexus
requirement is important, for otherwise, the half-truth rule might be read so
broadly as to devour both the general rule that countenances silence and the
exceptions that impose a duty to speak.

in order to trigger an opponent's repayment obligations under a promissory note, violated a
disciplinary rule prohibiting misrepresentation).
89. See generally Bernard D. Reams, Jr., Revocation ofAcademic Degrees by Colleges and
Universities, 14 J.e. & U.L. 283, 30 I (1987) (stating that "both public and private universities
possess the authority to revoke degrees already conferred").
90. See In re Conduct of Kumley, 75 P.3d 432, 435 (Or. 2003) (holding that an inactive
attorney's misconduct in describing himself as an "attorney" on forms that he submitted to two
state agencies in connection with his candidacy for the state legislature warranted reprimand).
91. Cf. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS, supra note I, § 529 cmt. a ("[AJ statement by a vendor
that his title has been upheld by a particular court is a false representation if he fails to disclose
his knowledge that an appeal from the decision is pending.").
92. See, e.g., Fid. Mortgage Co. v. Cook, 821 S.W.2d 39,43 (Ark. 1991 ) (imposing liability
based on failure by a bank to disclose that it lacked the capacity to fund a loan that it had
committed to make); Randi W. v. Muroc Joint Unified Sch. Dist., 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d 263, 272-73
(Cal. 1997) (involving letters of recommendation that cast an administrator in a positive light
without mentioning prior complaints of his sexual impropriety with students); Kannavos v.
Annino, 247 N.E.2d 708, 711 (Mass. 1969) (holding that where houses were advertised as
investment properties and were being rented to the public for multifamily purposes, the vendors
were bound to disclose to purchasers that multifamily use of the houses violated zoning laws
because "[aJlthough there may be no duty imposed upon one party to a transaction to speak for
the information of the other if he does speak with reference to a given point of information,
voluntarily or at the other's request, he is bound to speak honestly and to divulge all the material
facts bearing upon the point that lie within his knowledge") (internal alterations and quotations
omitted); Junius Constr. Corp. v. Cohen, 178 N.E. 672, 674 (N.Y. 1931) (Cardozo, J.) (holding
that while a vendor of property was under no duty to mention planned streets, having disclosed
two of them, he was obliged to reveal a third street which, if opened, would divide the plot in
half); ColumbialHCA Healthcare Corp. v. Couey, 72 S.W.3d 735, 744 (Tex. App. 2002)(stating
that partial disclosure about a retirement plan was fraudulent because it failed to indicate that
the plan could be rescinded at any time).
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2. Opinions, Puffing, State of Mind, and Implicit Statements of Fact

Some contend that an action for fraud must be based on a misrepresentation
of fact and that a mere assertion of opinion is an insufficient predicate for legal
liability. This is an overstatement, however, because in some instances, a
misleading statement of opinion will suffice as the basis for a fraud action. 93
Not surprisingly, many of the cases falling within this important exception
involve professionals. If a doctor, lawyer, or other professional knows of the
misleading nature of her statement of opinion, or acts with reckless indifference
thereto, a layperson who detrimentally relies may be entitled to sue for damages.
In sorting out which statements of opinion by lawyers relating to credentials
or experience may give rise to liability, several distinct rules that have evolved
from the misrepresentation cases should be considered. These rules concern (1 )
puffing, (2) misrepresentation of state of mind, and (3) implicit statements of
fact.
Puffing is sales talk, language that casts a rosy glow over a transaction, but
says nothing specific about the facts. 94 Words like "fine," "first-class," and
"best" are typical examples of puffing. According to a longstanding rule of tort
law, puffing is permissible. 95 This makes good sense. "Puffing" by sellers often
renders difficult, burdensome, or annoying transactions a bit more pleasant or
tolerable, and it also greases the wheels of the economy by increasing the
frequency of commercial exchange. "Puffing" is as important in the legal field
as any other course of endeavor, for the economic realities of law practice
cannot be ignored.

93. Thus, it was written more than a century ago:
Generally speaking, the representations must be as to a material fact, susceptible
of knowledge; and, if they appearto be mere matters of opinion or conjecture, they
are not actionable. There are many cases, however, in which even a false assertion
of an opinion will amount to a fraud, the reason being that, under the
circumstances, the other party has a right to rely upon what is stated or
represented. Thus, the liability may arise where one has or assumes to have
knowledge upon a subject of which the other is ignorant, and knowingly makes
false statements, on which the other relies.
Hedin v. Minneapolis Med. & Surgical Inst., 64 N.W. 158, 159 (Minn. 1895).
94. See PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS, supra note 3, at 757 (stating that "sales talk, or
puffing, ... is considered to be offered and understood as an expression of the seller's opinion
only, ... on which no reasonable man would rely").
95. See Millerv. William ChevroletlGEO, Inc., 762 N.E.2d 1,7 (Ill. App. Ct. 2001) (stating
that "[p]uffing is defined as a bare and naked statement as to value of a product and is
considered a non actionable assertion of opinion") (internal quotations omitted); Prudential Ins.
Co., v. Jefferson Assocs., Ltd., 896 S.W.2d 156, 163 (Tex. 1995) (stating that representations
by a vendor that a "building was 'superb,' 'super fine,' and 'one of the finest little properties
in the City of Austin'" were merely puffing and could not constitute fraud).
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Impressing prospective clients is a prerequisite to successful
private law practice .... [L]awyers face considerable pressure to
bring in new clients. A solo practitioner needs new clients to pay the
rent and meet the payroll. In large firms, each lawyer must attract
business in order to become a partner and to earn a share of the
profits.
After a client has hired a lawyer or a firm, the problem of making
a good impression changes. Lawyers must maintain and cultivate
their clients' initial positive impressions ....96
Not surprisingly, lawyers routinely engage in puffing and do not consider it
improper.97 Like everyone else, attorneys may contend that the glass is half full,
rather than half empty. As the Second Circuit recently wrote: "It can be
expected that any professional will convey to potential clients a healthy selfestimation.,,98 Any theory of liability for attorney misrepresentation of
credentials or experience must accommodate the rule that says that puffing is
permissible. However, statements that extend beyond expressing a favorable
opinion. and instead assert false facts, are actionable. There is an important
difference between a flattering characterization and a gross exaggeration. 99 In
addition, puffing is subject to at least two important limitations. The first
concerns state of mind, and the second concerns implicit factual assertions.
As Lord Bowen famously said, "The state of a man's mind ... is as much a
fact as the state of his digestion." 100 If a plaintiff can prove that the defendant
misrepresented his state of mind when uttering an opinion, the defendant may
be liable. This rule applies to doctors 101 and lawyers,102 as well as other
96. See Lerman, supra note 2, at 662.
97. See id. at 721-23. With respect to their expertise, H[m]any lawyers argue that puffing
is harmless as long as clients do not have to pay for the extra time the lawyer takes to acquire
expertise" and "do not consider what they characterize as 'puffing' to be lying." Id. at 753.
98. Baker v. Dorfman, 239 F.3d 415, 423 (2d Cir. 2000); see also Griffin v. Fowler, 579
S.E.2d. 848, 853 (Ga. Ct. App. 2003) ("In the absence offalse or grossly misleading statements
which evidence an intent to create a false impression of expertise or experience, it is not fraud
for an attorney to convey to a potential client a healthy self-estimation of ability.").
99. Baker, 239 F.3d at 423 (finding that statements in an attorney's resume went beyond
puffing and "were either false or grossly misleading, and created the false impression ... of an
experienced litigator"); see also supra note 13 and accompanying text.
100. Edgington v. Fitzmaurice, L.R. 29 Ch. Div. 459, 483 (1885).
101. Cf Hedin v. Minneapolis Med. & Surgical Inst., 64 N.W. 158. 159-60 (Minn. 1895)
("The doctor. with his skill and ability, should be able to approximate to the truth when giving
his opinion .... If he ... does not believe the statement true, ... but represents it as true, ...
it is to be inferred that he intended to deceive .... [A]n action for deceit will lie.").
102. See Graubard Mollen Dannett & Horowitz v. Moskovitz, 653 N.E.2d 1179, 1184 (N.Y.
1995) (holding that a law firm stated a claim by alleging that the defendant attorney
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defendants. 1m Suppose that an attorney says that he has extensive experience in
a particular area of the law, a good track record in a certain type of case, or
unbeatable credentials. If the plaintiff can prove that the attorney lacked
confidence in the facts that the assertion implied, damages may be available. 104
It will be hard to unearth the needed proof because the attorney will likely claim
that he believed the statements made. But the discovery process in litigation
often reveals the unexpected. Business records, correspondence, or statements
in depositions by colleagues or former employees may supply the evidence the
plaintiff needs to show misrepresentation of the attorney's state of mind.
In addition, every statement of opinion carries with it at least two implicit
statements of fact: first, that the speaker has some factual basis for uttering the
view expressed, and second, that the facts known to the speaker are not wholly
inconsistent with the opinion voiced.105 A lawyer cannot say that he is "good at
oil and gas law," if he knows nothing about the subject, 106 nor can he make that
claim if he has recently been held liable for malpractice based on incompetence
in that field.
An example of an expression of opinion giving rise to an implicit statement
of fact can be drawn from the medical context. Predictions of success, as mere
opinions about the future, typically are not actionable. I07 In an early case,
however, a court stated:

"represented orally to the partnership that he ... would act to ensure the future of the firm ...
when he never intended to do so"); Martin v. Ohio State Univ. Found., 742 N.E.2d 1198, 1205
(Ohio Ct. App. 2000) (stating, in a suit against a lawyer, that misrepresentation of "existing
mental attitude" is actionable).
103. Cf Bogle v. Bragg, 548 S.E.2d 396, 400 (Ga. Ct. App. 200 I) (stating, in a case against
company directors and a corporate attorney, that a claim for fraud cannot lie on representations
as to future events, "except that fraud may be predicated on a promise made with a present
intention not to perform").
104. In such a case, the defendant's proven lack of confidence in what was said will establish
both the fact that state of mind was misrepresented and scienter, for one way to prove scienter
is to show that the maker of the statement did "not have the confidence in the accuracy of his
representation that he state! d] or implie[d]." RESTATEMENT OF TORTS, supra note I, § 526(b).
105. Id. § 539; see also Crown Cork & Seal Co. v. Hires Bottling of Chic., 371 F.2d 256,
258 (7th Cir. 1967).
106. See, e.g., Baker v. Dorfman, 239 F.3d 415, 424 & n.24 (2d Cir. 2000) (holding an
attorney liable for resume fraud for claiming, among other things, that he acted as "regular
counsel to public and private companies in connection with regulatory issues under the
Americans with Disabilities Act," when he had never done any such work).
107. See Maness v. Reese, 489 S.W.2d 660, 663 (Tex. App. 1972) (stating that "predictions
and opinions do not serve as a basis for actionable fraud"); PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS,
supra note 3, at 762 (stating that "[o]rdinarily a prediction as to events to occur in the future is
to be regarded as a statement of opinion only, on which the adverse party has no right to rely").
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The plaintiff, an illiterate man, badly injured in an accident ...
consulted with the physician . . . as to his condition and the
probability of a recovery. After an examination by the surgeons, he
was positively assured ... that he could be cured, and by treatment
at that institute could and would be made sound and well. . . .
[T]here was something more in defendants' [sic] statements than the
mere expression of his opinion upon a matter of conjecture and
uncertainty. It amounted to a representation that plaintiff's physical
condition was such as to insure a complete recovery. lOS
Presumably, a similar analysis regarding implied facts may apply in the legal
field, not only with respect to predictions of future success, but also statements
of opinions about credentials or experience.
C. Outright Lies

Scholars say that "[d]eception by omission and by commission are morally
identical: the purpose and the consequences are the same."I09 Yet it is often
easier to condemn a bold-faced lie, than to censure nondisclosure or decry an
incomplete statement. Not surprisingly, there are many cases holding attorneys
liable for deliberately false statements. I10 Fraudulent entries on a resume'" or
a website relating to credentials or experience are illustrations. Because honesty
is highly relevant to job performance by lawyers, a false statement by an
attorney on a job application about class rank or other academic information will
often be regarded as material.' '2
108. Hedin v. Minneapolis Med. & Surgical Inst., 64 N.W. 158, 159-60 (Minn. 1895). The
court indicated that if the implicit assertion was knowingly false, an action for deceit would lie.
See id. at 160.
109. See Lerman, supra note 2, at 663.
110. See. e.g., McKinnon v. Tibbetts, 440 A.2d 1028, 1029 (Me. 1982) (holding an attorney
liable for fraud based on falsely assuring a client that he "was pursuing the claim even though
he was not taking any action").
Ill. See Baker, 239 F.3d at 423 (affirming a tinding that an attorney committed fraud where
representations in the attorney's resume were "either false or grossly misleading, and created
the false impression [that the attorney was] an experienced litigator").
112. See Miller v. Beneficial Mgt. Corp., 855 F. Supp. 691 (D.N.J. 1994). In Miller, the
plaintifffalsely stated her grade point average, class rank, and other information. Id. at 697 &
nn.6 & 7. In addressing discrimination issues, the court wrote:
Resume fraud asserted in support of an after-acquired evidence defense must
be material, directly related to measuring a candidate for employment, and must
have been relied t:pon by the employer in making the hiring decision ....
Miller's misrepresentations, if proven to be intentional, would certainly fulfill
this standard. As an attorney, and an applicant for ajob as an attorney, Miller was
required and expected to maintain the highest standard of veracity and integrity.
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In many instances, the issue is not what constitutes a lie, but whether a
particular statement was ever made. The issue of whether an attorney previously
lied about credentials or experience will often tum on conflicting versions of
what was orally expressed during the commencement or continuance of legal
representation. The client will testify that the lawyer said one thing, which if
credited by the jury, will mean that the lawyer lied. The lawyer, in contrast, will
deny that the statement was ever made. The question of legal liability for fraud
will hang in the balance.

D. Other Considerations
I. Scienter
Regardless of whether an action for fraud is based on nondisclosure, a
misleading statement, or an utter falsehood, the plaintiff must prove scienter, a
particular culpable state of mind. In general, "scienter" is established by
evidence showing that the defendant acted with knowledge of falsity or reckless
disregard for the truth.1I3 Section 526 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts is
somewhat more precise. The Restatement provides that a misrepresentation is
"fraudulent" - that is to say, made with scienter - if the speaker "(a) knows
or believes that the matter is not as he represents it to be, (b) does not have the
confidence in the accuracy of his representation that he states or implies, or (c)
knows that he does not have the basis for his representation that he states or
implies." I 14 If there is evidence that a lawyer, with respect to credentials or
experience, deliberately failed to disclose material information when there was
a duty to speak, knew that what was uttered was misleading, or intentionally
falsified the facts, scienter will be established.

2. Intent to Induce Reliance
Cases frequently say that to be liable in fraud for damages based on
misrepresentation, the defendant must not only act with scienter, 115 but also must
intend to defraud the plaintiff. I 16 This a slight overstatement, however, because
The Rules of Professional Conduct, in fact, make it professional misconduct for
a lawyer to inter alia engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or
misrepresentation.
Id. at 710 n.22 (internal citations, quotations, and alterations omitted).
113. See RONALD E. MAllEN & JEfFREY M. SMITH, LEGAL MALPRACTICE § 8.10, at 826 (5th
ed.2000).
114. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS, supra note I, § 526.
115. See supra Part II.D.1.
116. See Jean v. Tyson-Jean, 118 S.W.3d 1,9 n.9 (Tex. App. 2003) (stating that "[bJecause
appellant testified there was no 'intention' on the part of [others] to defraud her, actual fraud
could not have been proved").
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expectation of reliance will suffice as a basis for liability, even if the defendant
does not desire to induce reliance. 117
Cases in which the defendant misrepresents material facts about credentials
or experience while dealing directly with the plaintiff pose few problems. The
dealings between the parties will show that reliance was highly foreseeable to,
ifnot plainly desired by, the defendant. Difficult questions may arise, however,
in cases where there are no personal dealings between the parties, and no
evidence of intent on the part of the defendant for a particular false or
misleading message to be conveyed to the plaintiff. In these cases, it may be
useful to differentiate written misrepresentations from oral misrepresentations.
The Restatement contains a provision addressing written misrepresentations
"incorporated in [aJ document or otherthing." I 18 According to the commentary,
"the maker of a fraudulent misrepresentation incorporated in a document has
reason to expect that it will reach and influence any person whom the document
reaches.""9 This would seem to suggest that, in cases of resume fraud, anyone
whom the resume reaches may rely on its contents and sue for damages. One
might, by analogy, argue that the same rule also applies to misstatements
incorporated into websites, which are the electronic equivalent to documents.
However, at least one caveat must be noted. Despite the breadth of the
Restatement's comment, the blackletter rule is written in tighter terms. The rule
reads:
One who embodies a fraudulent misrepresentation in an article of
commerce, a muniment of title, a negotiable instrument or a similar
commercial document, is subject to liability for pecuniary loss
caused to another who deals with him or with a third person
regarding the article or document in justifiable reliance upon the
truth of the representation. 120
Thus, it can be argued that a resume or a website, even if it misrepresents
credentials or experience, is not a "commercial document" that is "similar" to
the type of "article of commerce, ... muniment of title, [or] ... negotiable
instrument" with which the blackletter rule is concerned. 121
Different problems are posed by oral misrepresentations regarding credentials
or experience that reach someone other than the intended recipient. The
117. RESTATEMENTOFToRTS, supra note I, § 531 (stating that liability for fraud extends to
persons whom the defendant "intends or has reason to expect to act or to refrain from action in
reliance upon the misrepresentation").
118. See id. § 532.
119. /d. § 532 cmt. b.
120. [d. § 532.
121. See id.
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commentary to the Restatement's general rule on "expectation of influencing
conduct,,122 states that a general risk of reliance, inherent in virtually every
misrepresentation, is insufficient for liabiIity.123 Rather:
The maker of the misrepresentation must have information that
would lead a reasonable man to conclude that there is an especial
likelihood that it will reach those persons and will influence their
conduct .... 124
In nonattomey contexts, some courts have gone to great lengths to indicate that
foreseeable reliance is not sufficient to allow a third party to sue for fraud. 125 It
would not be surprising to see a similarly rigorous standard applied to cases in
which attorneys are alleged to have misrepresented their credentials or
experience. In states following the Restatement rule, a plaintiff would have to
prove that the facts demonstrated an "especial likelihood" that the plaintiff
would rely upon the misrepresentation. Presumably, liability would be imposed
only in instances where the lawyer knew or had a particular reason to foresee
that the misrepresentation of credentials or experience would reach the plaintiff,
who would rely thereon.
3. Reliance, Causation, and Damages

A cause of action for fraud protects the plaintiff s decision-making process
from being infected by false, misleading, or incomplete information. No harm
is caused by a misrepresentation, however, unless the plaintiff relies.
Accordingly, in every fraud action the plaintiff must prove both reliance l26 and
that reliance caused damages. 127
It may be difficult to establish reliance on a misrepresentation in cases where
the client is sophisticated about business matters or has other legal counsel, for

122. Id.§531.
123. Id. § 531 cm!. d.
124. Id.
125. See Ernst & Young. L.L.P. v. Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 51 S.W.3d 573 (Tex. 2001)
(embracing a reason-to-expect-reliance standard that requires more than foreseeability).
126. See, e.g., Kennedy v. Venrock Assocs .. 348 F.3d 584, 592 (7th Cir. 2003); see also
DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS § 474. at 1358 (2000).
127. See, e.g., Area Landscaping, L.L.c. v. Glaxo-Wellcome, Inc., 586 S.E.2d 507, 512
(N.C. C!. App. 2003). Of course, dishonest conduct causes other harm beyond the forms of
damage that are legally cognizable in an action for fraud. See Lerman, supra note 2, at 679-84
(discussing the harm caused by lawyer deception of clients, including professional harm to the
reputation of individual lawyers and the bar as a whole, damage to lawyers' internal standards
of integrity. perpetuation of hidden errors, damage to the lawyer-client relationship, and damage
to relationships between lawyers).
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in such cases, it is less likely that the client was in fact misled. I :!& Of course,
client sophistication or access to legal counsel are only two considerations in
assessing whether reliance occurred; there are many others. In particular, if the
plaintiff knew of the falsity of the representation l29 or the existence of the
undisclosed fact 130 before making the decision in question, reliance cannot be
proved. Thus, if a client knows that a lawyer's assertion about experience or
credentials is false, an action for fraud will not be successful.
In addition, if there are "danger signals" that would cause a reasonable person
to inquire,131 and the plaintiff fails to do so, the plaintiff may be estopped from
claiming reliance.132 However, if there is nothing to cause the plaintiff to
distrust the defendant's claims other than the defendant's self-interest, the
plaintiff typically may accept the defendant's affirmative statements at face
value and need not conduct an investigation to determine whether they are
true. 133 "[TJhe victim of a misrepresentation has no duty to investigate the
128. See Coastal Bank SSB v. Chase Bank, N.A., 135 S.W.3d 840, 842-43 (Tex. App. 2004)
(In addressing communications between two banks, the court noted that "[tJhis was an arm's
length transaction between two sophisticated financial institutions who were both represented
by counsel. While such a relationship is not, standing alone, dispositive of the issue of reliance,
it is a factor to be considered."); see also Williams Ford, Inc. v. Hartford Courant Co., 657 A.2d
212, 222 (Conn. 1995) (holding that reliance was not assumed in communications between
sophisticated commercial parties, but was a question of fact).
129. See Richter v. Wagner Oil Co., 90 S.W.3d 890, 896 (Tex. App. 2002) (stating in the
context of business litigation that a party who has learned that a representation is false cannot
rely upon it and then sue).
130. See Miller v. Kennedy & Minshew. P.c., 142 S.W.3d 325,343-44 (Tex. App. 2003)
(holding that where client discovered facts allegedly withheld by the attorney, yet continued the
representation, the law firm was not prevented from collecting its contingent fee by reason of
having engaged in misleading and deceptive conduct).
131. Typically, a client will have less reason to investigate the facts when dealing with a
lawyer than when dealing with another person in an arm's length relationship. See Willis v.
Maverick, 760 S.W.2d 642,645 (Tex. 1988) ("As a fiduciary, an attorney is obligated to render
a full and fair disclosure of facts material to the client's representation. The cl ient must feel free
to rely on his attorney's advice. Facts which might ordinarily require investigation likely may
not excite suspicion where a fiduciary relationship is involved.") (internal citations omitted).
132. See Greycas, Inc. v. Proud, 826 F.2d 1560 Oth Cir. 1987). In Greycas, the defendant
required a loan applicant to supply an attorney's opinion letter containing assurances that there
were no prior liens on the equipment that was to serve as security. Id. at 1562. The court held
that the defendant finance company could rely upon the attorney's assurances, even though it
would not have been hard for it to conduct its own UCC lien search. ld. at 1566. If, however,
the opinion letter had disclosed that the attorney was the loan applicant's brother-in-law, that
"might have been a warning signal that [the finance company] could ignore only at its peril" and
that "[tJo go forward in the face of a known danger is to assume the risk." Id.
133. See Judd v. Walker, 114 S.W. 979, 981 (Mo. 1908) (stating that the plaintiff could rely
upon the defendant's definite statement as to the acreage of land and was not required to
measure the property himself because one need not deal "with [one's] fellow man as if he was

2004]

MISREPRESENTATION BY LA WYERS

559

truthfulness of the deceit .... "134 This rule is particularly applicable where the
party making the statement is a lawyer, a person professionally bound to avoid
conduct involving "dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation."135 For
example, in a case involving an attorney's false statement to opposing counsel
during settlement negotiations about the amount of insurance coverage that was
available, the Indiana Supreme Court stated:
We decline to require attorneys to burden unnecessarily the courts
and litigation process with discovery to verify the truthfulness of
material representations made by opposing counsel. The reliability
of lawyers' representations is an integral component of the fair and
efficient administration of justice. The law should promote lawyers'
care in making statements that are accurate and trustworthy and
should foster the reliance upon such statements by others. 136
Consequently, a lawyer who lies about credentials ordinarily will not be
permitted to argue that a client or prospective client should not have trusted the
lawyer's representations.
With regard to proving that a misrepresentation about credentials or
experience caused damage, a recent Texas case from the medical field l37 is
instructive. In this case, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant-physician had
fraudulently induced him to consent to surgery by telling him that he had
performed arthroscopy on football star Troy Aikman when, in actuality, he had
never performed arthroscopy on anyone. 138 The appellate court held that even
if the trial court erred in dismissing the plaintiff s claim for fraud, the error was
harmless because the plaintiff failed to show that the physician was negligent in
performing patient's surgery or in caring for him thereafter, and thus, the alleged
misrepresentation did not injure the plaintiff. 139
In the context of an attorney's misrepresentation of credentials or experience,
there may be difficult questions regarding what the plaintiff must prove by way
of actionable harm. If the lawyer was engaged to conduct litigation, some courts
may require the plaintiff to show that, "but for" the misrepresentation, the case
a thief or a robber").
134. Chapman Lumber, Inc. v. Tager, No. CVOl0086006S, 2003 WL 22080469, at *4
(Conn. Super. Ct. Aug. 22, 2003).
135. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.4 (2002).
136. Fire Ins. Exch. v. Bell, 643 N.E.2d 310, 313 (Ind. 1994).
137. See Byington v. Mize, No. 05-00-00786-CV, 2002 WL 1494219 (Tex. App. July IS,
2002) (involving claims for fraudulent inducement, constructive fraud, and negligent
misrepresentation).
138. [d. at **3-4.
139. [d. at *4 (stating that "Byington can identify no injury he experienced at Dr. Mize's
hands, even if he were misled as to the doctor's experience").
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would not have been lost. 140 However, in cases involving transactional work,
and perhaps in other contexts, it may suffice to establish that the attorney's
default caused the loss of an advantageous opportunity.'41 There are cases that
suggest that demonstrating that the defendant's error made everything more
difficult or expensive will be enough to prove that a breach of duty caused
damage. 142
4. Nonclients

Fraud is readily actionable by third parties, even in cases where the defendant
is an attorney. Thus,
If an attorney commits actual fraud in his dealings with a third party,
the fact he did so in the capacity of attorney for a client does not
relieve himofliability .... While an attorney's professional duty of
care extends only to his own client and intended beneficiaries of his
legal work, the limitations on liability for negligence do not apply to
liability for fraud. 143
Consequently, false statements about credentials or experience made to a
prospective client who detrimentally relies thereon are likely to support a cause
of action for fraud, if the other requirements of the action are met. As discussed
below,'44 however, the same is not true in an action for negligent
misrepresentation. In actions based on negligence, rather than fraud, the scope
of liability is more tightly limited because the defendant has acted with less
culpability.
5. Privacy Interests of the Attorney

In some contexts, the duty that an attorney has to disclose to a client facts
relating to credentials or experience may be offset by the attorney's privacy
140. Cf Orrick Herrington & Sutcliff, L.L.P. v. Super. Ct., 132 Cal. Rptr. 2d 658, 659 (Cal.
Ct. App. 2003) (stating that if legal malpractice claim asserts negligent prosecution or defense,
a case-within-a-case method should be employed).
141. Cf Viner v. Sweet, 70 P.3d 1046, 1050 (Cal. 2003) (stating that, in a case involving
legal work relating to the sale of a business, plaintiffs were required to show that but for the
defendant's negligence "(I) they would have had a more advantageous agreement (the 'better
deal' scenario), or (2) they would not have entered into the transaction ... and therefore would
have been better off (the 'no deal' scenario)").
142. See Vahila v. Hall, 674 N.E.2d 1164, 1169 (Ohio 1997) (noting that a "strict 'but for'
test" for causation tends to overprotect errant attorneys and require the introduction of "remote
and speculative" evidence).
143. Vega v. Jones, Day, Reavis & Pogue, 17 Cal. Rptr. 3d 26, 32 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004)
(internal quotations and citations omitted).
144. See infra Part lILA.
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interests. Consider, for example, the case of an attorney who earned low grades
in the relevant law school course. Federal law has set up an elaborate array of
statutory and regulatory provisions preventing unauthorized disclosure of
academic information. The Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974
(FERPA)145 broadly bans educational institutions from releasing educational
records of present or former students. 146 While the lawyer to whom the records
relate may consent to release of that information,147 courts should not lightly
force attorneys to surrender their educational privacy rights.
Similarly, many students receive testing accommodations under the
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA),148 which requires educational
institutions to protect the confidentiality of related information. 149 Attorneys
who receive accommodations in law school may not need to disclose that
information to clients, 150 although the issue has not yet been resolved by the
judiciary. Courts should tread carefully in these and related areas, where
recognition of broad common law obligations might threaten to disrupt or defeat
federal legislative policy.

lll. Negligence
Although fraud provides a framework for balancing the competing interests
of attorneys and clients in cases involving alleged misrepresentation of
credentials or experience, fraud is not the only viable avenue for relief of
aggrieved clients. Clients who are harmed by an attorney's misrepresentation
of credentials or experience may also seek redress under the law of negligence
by suing for negligent misrepresentation or negligent failure to obtain informed
consent.

145. 20 U.S.c. § 1232g (2000).
146. See generally Dixie Snow Huefner & Lynn M. Daggett, FERPA Update: Balancing
Access to and Privacy of Student Records, 152 Eouc. L. REP. 469 (200 I).
147. See Margaret L. O'Donnell, FERPA: Ollly Olle Piece of the Privacy Puzzle, 29 J.c. &
U.L. 679, 686 (2003) (stating that, under FERPA, "[alII education records are confidential and
cannot be disclosed unless the student consents or the disclosure fits one of the exceptions").
148. See generally Donald H. Stone, What Law Schools Are Doing to Accommodate
Students with Learning Disabilities, 42 S. TEX. L. REV. 19 (2000).
149. Under the ADA, educational institutions are required to provide an array of special
accommodations for students with learning disabilities, including, for example, extra time to
complete exams. See id. at 26.
150. Compare Frances A. McMorris,Aspiring Lawyer with Dyslexia Gets Test Access, WAlL
ST. J., July 18, 1997, at B I (opining that "lawyers aren't required to disclose their disabilities
to clients"), with Scott Lemond & David Mizgala, Identifying and Accommodating the Learning
Disabled Lawyer, 42 S. TEX. L. REV. 69, 90 (2000) (stating that "[illlness or disability ...
cannot serve as a shield to liability for failure to comport with rules of professional conduct").

562

OKLAHOMA LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 57:529

A claim for negligence is often preferable to one based on intentional
wrongdoing 15 1 because it is usually easier to impose vicarious liability,152 or
reach insurance proceeds,153 when the action is for lack of care, as opposed to
intentional harm. If the defendant's lack of care is egregious and constitutes
gross negligence or recklessness, rather than ordinary negligence, the plaintiff
may also recover the type of exemplary damages that are available in an action
for fraud. J54 Suing for negligence, rather than fraud, also avoids the stringent
requirements for pleading and proof that are often applicable to fraud actions. 155
Thus, there are several good reasons for plaintiffs to frame misrepresentations
by attorneys about credentials or experience as negligence claims, rather than as
actions for fraud.
Disadvantages, however, do exist for negligence actions. One possible
disadvantage of suing for negligence rather than fraud concerns defenses.
Contributory negligence is a defense in any action based on lack of care.
151. See, e.g., Vincent R. Johnson, Transferred Intent in American Ton Law, 87 MARQ. L.
REV. 903, 908-09 (2004) (arguing that "the transferred-intent doctrine serves little useful
purpose with respect to third parties [who suffer accidental injury], for actions based on lack of
care typically provide plaintiffs with a better route to recovery").
152. Cf Medlin v. Bass, 398 S.E.2d 460, 464 (N.C. 1990) (stating in a sexual assault action
that "intentional tortious acts are rarely considered to be within the scope of an employee's
employment") (quoting Brown v. Burlington Indus., Inc., 378 S.E.2d 232, 235 (N.C. Ct. App.
1989)).
153. See 7 A JOHN A. ApPLEMAN ET AL., INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE § 4501.09, at 267
(Supp. 2003) (indicating that "[i]ntentional injuries, generally, are not covered"). Proof of
negligence may also avoid an exclusion from coverage for fraudulent or dishonest conduct. See
II LEE R. Russ, COUCH ON INSURANCE § 161.19 (3d ed. 2004) [hereinafter COUCH ON
INSURANCE] (For negligence to constitute fraud, "there must be more than mere negligence,
done with an honest intent. Stated otherwise, there must be something more than negligence,
mistake, carelessness, errors in judgment, inattention to business, or incompetence in order to
satisfy the definition of dishonesty .... ").
154. For example, in Texas, gross negligence will support an award of punitive damages.
See TEX. Crv. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 41.003 (Vernon 1997 & Supp. 2004) (stating that
"exemplary damages may be awarded only if the claimant proves by clear and convincing
evidence that the harm with respect to which the claimant seeks recovery of exemplary damages
results from: (I) fraud; (2) malice; or (3) gross negligence").
155. FED. R. Crv. P. 9(b) (requiring a complaint alleging fraud to state "the circumstances
constituting fraud ... with particularity"). Many states have a similar requirement. See, e.g.,
Hills Transp. Co. v. S.W. Forest, 72 Cal. Rptr. 441, 444 (Cal. Ct. App. 1968) ("It is well
established that the pleading of fraud and deceit must be specific .... "). Most states also
provide that the burden of persuasion with respect to fraud is higher than the ordinary
"preponderance of the evidence" standard. See Kilduff v. Adams, Inc., 593 A.2d 478, 487
(Conn. 1991) (indicating that "numerous courts have stated that a heightened burden of proof
applies to all the elements of the cause of action for fraud, including damages," but holding that
a "clear and satisfactory evidence" standard applied to all elements of fraud, except damages,
which required only a preponderance of the evidence).
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Consequently, if the plaintiffs reliance on a negligent misrepresentation was
unreasonable, such carelessness on the part of the plaintiff, in most states, 156 will
reduce or preclude recovery based on applicable principles of comparative
negligence l57 or comparative fault. 158 In contrast, negligence on the part of the
plaintiff is almost never a defense to intentional torts, and therefore cannot be
raised in most fraud actions. 159

A. Negligent Misrepresentation
There is authority from the medical field that misrepresentation of experience
is actionable as a form of negligent misrepresentation. 160 The central landmark
156. The District of Columbia and four states have not adopted comparative negligence or
comparative fault and still retain strict common law contributory negligence, which makes
unreasonable conduct by the plaintiff a total bar to any action based on negligence. See Bergob
v. Scrushy. 855 So. 2d 523 (Ala. Civ. App. 2002) (stating Alabama law); Wingfield v. Peoples
Drug Store. Inc .• 379 A.2d 685 (D.C. 1977) (stating District of Columbia law); Pippin v.
Potomac Elec. Power Co., 132 F. Supp. 2d 379 (D. Md. 2001) (stating Maryland law); Yancey
v. Lea, 532 S.E.2d 560 (N.C. Ct. App. 2000) (stating North Carolina law); Litchford v.
Hancock, 352 S.E.2d 335 (Va. 1987) (stating Virginia law).
157. There are two basic regimes for comparative negligence, "pure" and "modified." Under
pure comparative negligence, a contributorily negligent plaintiff is not barred from recovery,
but damages are reduced in proportion to the plaintiffs lack of care. Under modified
comparative negligence, there is typically a 50% threshold. If the plaintiffs contributory
negligence exceeds (or, in some jurisdictions. equals) 50% of the total negligence, there can be
no recovery. If the plaintiff s contributory negligence is below 50%, the plaintiff can recover
proportionally reduced damages. See generally DOBBS, supra note 126, § 20\.
158. Under comparative fault, contributory negligence may be invoked to offset liability for
recklessness or strict liability. as well as liability for negligence, on either a pure or a modified
basis. See, e.g., UNIF. COMPARATIVE FAULT ACT §§ 1-2 (2003).
159. It is arguable that negligence on the part of the plaintiff cannot even be used as a
defense in a fraud action based on recklessness, rather than intentionally tortious conduct:
It is usually assumed in discussions of deterrence as a goal of tort law that
what is to be deterred is specific misbehavior like driving too fast or lying to
potential buyers. In fraud cases, however, it may be useful to regard the
appropriate deterrence as being deterrence of making a living by looking for
gullible people with whom to deal. There is no social utility in seeking out
potential customers who are too ignorant or foolish to realize that they are being
cheated. Therefore. "unreasonable" behavior by the victim of a fraud should not
be. and is not, a defense; the point of this body of law is precisely to deter the
defendant from seeking out that kind of buyer. In ordinary negligence cases, the
injured person's negligence may well be a defense (at least in part) because
carelessness on the part of victims, as well as injurers, should be deterred. and
because it becomes harder to say that the injurer was negligent if the victim
messed up badly. But in deceit cases, gullibility of the injured person is more like
an element of the tort than a defense.
VINCENT R. JOHNSON & ALAN GUNN, TEACHING TORTS 295-96 (2d ed. 1999).
160. See, e.g., Bloskas v. Murray, 646 P.2d 907 (Colo. 1982). In Bloskas, the court extended
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in the law of negligent misrepresentation is Section 552 of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts. Section 552 provides:
(1) One who, in the course of his business, profession or
employment, or in any other transaction in which he has a pecuniary
interest, supplies false information for the guidance of others in their
business transactions, is subject to liability for pecuniary loss caused
to them by their justifiable reliance upon the information, if he fails
to exercise reasonable care or competence in obtaining or
communicating the information. 161

Under this section or similar rules of law, attorneys have been held liable for
making negligent misstatements that resulted in economic harm to clients and
third parties. 162 The utterance of a statement may be negligent, even if the
speaker has an honest belief in its truth, because of lack of reasonable care in
verifying the facts, or lack of ordinary skill or competence typical of the
particular calling. 163
There is an important question, not definitively resolved, about whether
silence can form the basis for a negligent-misrepresentation action or whether
there must be some type of affirmative misstatement. Suppose, for example,
that an attorney negligently fails to disclose adverse material information about
credentials or experience, which other principles oflaw, such as the rules about
facts basic to the transaction 164 or facts not reasonably discoverable,165 create a
duty to reveal. Can the attorney be sued for negligent misrepresentation? Or are

the doctrine of negligent misrepresentation to representations made in the course of the doctorpatient relationship because it found "no reason to deny relief when a physician negligently
conveys false information to the patient, and the patient relies upon the information to his
physical harm." Id. at 914-15. Interestingly, the action in Bloskas may have properly been one
for deceit, rather than negligent misrepresentation. The court noted that the doctor "told Mr.
Bloskas that he, as a member of his medical group, had participated in ankle replacement
surgery when in fact he had never previously performed such an operation." Id. at 915.
Presumably, the doctor knew whether he did, or did not, participate in such an operation. The
plaintiff may have been attempting to underplead the case as negligent misrepresentation rather
than fraud to reach insurance proceeds. See Ellen S. Pryor, The Stories We Tell: Intentional
Harm and the Questfor Insurance Funding, 75 TEx. L. REV. 1721 (1997) (discussing attempts
to establish negligence in cases involving intentional harm).
161. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS, supra note I, § 552.
162. See gellerally Nanneska N. Hazel, Depellding Upon the Care of Strangers:
Professiollals' Duty to Third Parties for Negligent Misrepresentation, 33 TEX. TECH. L. REV.
1073 (2002).
163. See Martin v. Ohio State Univ. Found., 742 N.E.2d 1198, 1209 (Ohio Ct. App. 2000).
164. See supra Part I1.A.I.
165. See supra Part I1.A.2.
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the rules of negligent misrepresentation applicable only if there has been some
type of false or misleading statement, as opposed to mere silence?
When the Restatement speaks of liability for negligently "supply[ing] false
information,"'66 it seems to suggest that there must be an affIrmative
misstatement. '67 Certain cases can be read to support this view. '68 Other cases,
however, have expressly held that for purposes of liability for negligent
misrepresentation, there is no difference between misleading silence and a false
or misleading statement. 169 Depending upon the view applicable in the relevant
jurisdiction, a large range of cases - those involving nondisclosure of material
information about credentials and experience - may be actionable under this
theory of recovery. 170
The scope of liability for economic harm resulting from negligent
misrepresentation l7l is more limited than the scope of liability for fraud. 172 In
166. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS, supra note I, § 552(1).
167. The text of the Restatement is unclear. Section 551 says:
One who fails to disclose to another a fact that he knows may justifiably induce
the other to act or refrain from acting in a business transaction is subject to the
same liability to the other as though he had represented the nonexistence of the
matter that he has failed to disclose ....
See id. § 551. The use of the word "knows" (rather than, for example, the phrase "should
know") arguably suggests that the stated rule applies only to cases involving scienter, not
negligent misrepresentation. But section 551 appears before section 552 on negligent
misrepresentation, so perhaps in endorsing section 551, the American Law Institute was not
addressing whether the same rule applies in cases of negligent misrepresentation.
168. See, e.g., Martin, 742 N.E.2d at 1209 ("A negligent misrepresentation claim does not
lie for omissions: there must be an affirmative false statement."); McCamish, Martin, Brown &
Loeffler v. F.E. Appling Interests, 991 S.W.2d 787 (Tex. 1999).
169. See, e.g., In re Agrobiotech, Inc., 291 F. Supp. 2d 1186, 1192 (D. Nev. 2003)
(,'Pursuant to § 551, silence about material facts basic to the transaction, when combined with
a duty to speak, is the functional equivalent of a misrepresentation or 'supplying false
information' under Restatement § 552."); see also Roberts v. Ball. Hunt, Hart, Brown &
Baerwitz. 128 Cal. Rptr. 901, 906 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976) (holding that attorneys could be held
liable for negligent misrepresentation based on failure to disclose doubts about a partnership'S
status as a general partnership).
170. Cf Armstrong v. Hrabal, 87 P.3d 1226, 1244 (Wyo. 2004) (holding that plaintiff could
not amend the complaint to add a "negligent misrepresentation" claim against an emergency
room physician, based on the physician's alleged failure to disclose a prior lawsuit against her,
because plaintiff had not "distinguished between the torts of negligent misrepresentation and
nondisclosure" and had "not adequately advocated for the adoption of the latter tort").
171. See Martha H. West Trust v. Mkt. Value of Atlanta, Inc., 584 S.E.2d 688, 691 (Ga. Ct.
App. 2003) (noting that absent privity, physical harm, willfulness, or property damage, liability
will not extend to all foreseeable victims).
172. See RESTATEMENT OF TORTS, supra note L § 552 cmt. a (stating that liability for
negligent misrepresentation is narrower than that for fraudulent misrepresentation). "When
there is no intent to deceive but only good faith coupled with negligence, the fault of the maker
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some cases, the plaintiff may be unable to show a sufficiently close connection
to the attorney to state a cause of action. A client or potential client who directly
receives negligently false information from a lawyer about his credentials or
experience stands in a better position to sue than one who receives that
infonnation indirectly. Yet there are many persons within the latter class. A
lawyer's statements about credentials or experience often circulate through the
community or are transmitted indirectly to potential plaintiffs by intennediaries.
If the lawyer who has allegedly engaged in negligent misrepresentation has not
dealt directly with the party who relies on the false infonnation, there is a
difficult question regarding whether the plaintiff is entitled to recover damages.
If precedent from the accounting cases l73 is followed in suits against lawyers,
there will likely be three different views. First, courts using the New York view
will require privity or a relationship akin to privitj.'74 Under this view, unless
the negligently erroneous infonnation about credentials or experience was

of the misrepresentation is sufficiently less to justify a narrower responsibility for its
consequences." ld.
173. The leading opinion on whether accountants are liable to third parties for negligent
misrepresentation is still Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 174 N.E. 441,444 (N. Y. 1931), in which
the court refused to hold accountants liable "in an indeterminate amount for an indeterminate
time to an indeterminate class." More recently, the California Supreme Court summarized the
complex state of the law as follows:
A substantial number ofjurisdictions follow the lead of Chief Judge Cardozo's
1931 opinion for the New York Court of Appeals in Ultra mares by denying
recovery to third parties for auditor negligence in the absence of a third party
relationship to the auditor that is "akin to privity." In contrast, a handful of
jurisdictions, spurred by law review commentary, have recently allowed recovery
based on auditor negligence to third parties whose reliance on the audit report was
"foreseeable. "
Most jurisdictions ... have steered a middle course based in varying degrees
on Restatement Second o/Torts section 552, which generally imposes liability on
suppliers of commercial information to third persons who are intended
beneficiaries of the information.
Bily v. Arthur Young & Co., 834 P.2d 745, 752 (Cal. 1992) (internal citations omitted)
(overruling lower court decisions which had followed a foreseeability approach and endorsing
the Restatement position).
174. See Goldfine v. DeEsso, 766 N.Y.S.2d 215, 216 (N.Y. App. Div. 2003) (holding that
a third-party negligent misrepresentation action against an attorney failed because the evidence
did not prove actual privity or a relationship that approached privity); Prudential Ins. Co. v.
Dewey, Ballantine, Bushby, Palmer & Wood, 590 N.Y.S.2d 831, 833 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992)
(relying on precedent from cases relating to accountants in holding that the relationship between
a lender and a borrower's law firm was sufficiently close to support liability for negligent
misrepresentation); Hedges v. Durrance, 834 A.2d I, 5 (VI. 2003) (stating that "in order to
sustain a cause of action against an attorney for negligent misrepresentation, a third party must
demonstrate a relationship so close as to approach that of privity") (internal quotations omitted).

2004]

MISREPRESENTATION BY LA WYERS

567

provided directly to the plaintiff by the defendant,175 or was transmitted to the
plaintiff through a third party under circumstances where the plaintiff was the
"end and aim of the transaction," 176 the plaintiffs suit will likely fail. Second.
some courts will embrace a foreseeability view. Under this approach, a plaintiff
who relies on negligently false information about a lawyer's credentials or
experience will only be permitted to recover if the plaintiffs reliance was
foreseeable to the defendant. Finally, some courts will embrace the Restatemenr
position, which requires more than mere foreseeability but less than privity or
its functional equivalent. 177 Under the Restatement approach, a plaintiff who
relies upon negligently false information about a lawyer's credentials or
experience may recover for resulting economic harm only if the plaintiff was
one of a limited group of persons for whose benefit the information was
supplied. Case law is already beginning to reflect these and other variations in
the rules governing attorneys' liability for negligent misrepresentation to
persons who do not deal with them directly. 178
Actions for negligent misrepresentation share some of the same requirements
that are applicable in actions for fraud. Among other things, the plaintiff must
establish reliance on the misrepresentation 179 and that the reliance caused
175. See Credit Alliance Corp. v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 493 N.Y.S.2d 435, 445 (N.Y.
1985) (finding that direct communications between a lender and a borrower's accountant
sufficiently approached privity to support an action for negligent misrepresentation).
176. Cf Glanzer v. Shepard, 135 N.E. 275, 275 (N.Y. 1922) (Cardozo, J.) (holding that a
weigher hired by the seller of beans was liable to the buyer for negligence because the buyer's
reliance on the statement of weight was the "end and aim of the transaction"); La Salle Nat'l
Bank v. Ernst & Young L.L.P., 729 N.Y.S.2d 671, 675 (N.Y. App. Div. 2001) (finding that a
returned telephone call was not sufficient linkage to support an action for negligent
misrepresentation).
177. According to the Restatement, liability for negligent misrepresentation is ordinarily
limited to losses suffered:
(al by the person or one of a limited group of persons for whose benefit and
guidance ... [the maker of the statement] intends to supply the information or
knows that the recipient intends to supply it; and
(b) through reliance upon it in a transaction that he intends the information to
influence or knows that the recipient so intends or in a substantially similar
transaction.
RESTATEMENT OF TORTS, supra note I, § 552(2).
178. See B.L.M. v. Sabo & Deitsch, 64 Cal. Rptr. 2d 335, 343 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997) (holding
that a developer failed to sufficiently allege that a law firm, which acted as special counsel for
a city and as bond counsel for a construction project, intended to induce the developer's reliance
on its representations); Lord v. Parisi, 19 P.3d 358, 363 (Or. Ct. App. 2001) (stating that a
nonclient may recover on a negligent misrepresentation claim against an attorney if there is
proof of a "special relationship, in which the party sought to be held Iiable had some obligation
to pursue the interests of the other party") (internal quotations omitted).
179. See Mehaffy, Rider, Windholz & Wilson v. Cent. Bank of Denver. N.A., 892 P.2d 230,
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damage. One should expect that the scope of liability for negligence will not
extend as far as in an action for fraud, for it is less culpable. Because that is
true, imposing broad liability risks running afoul of the proportionality principle.
which holds that liability should be proportional to fault. This public policy
principle may affect the course of litigation in many ways. In particular, the
proportionality principle may indirectly influence judicial determinations
regarding what evidence on damages is admissible, how the jury instructions
should be stated, and whether ajury verdict is subject to challenge on the ground
that it is excessive.
B. Lack of Informed Consent

Legal malpractice policies often exclude coverage for harm resulting from
dishonest or fraudulent conduct. '80 Consequently, there may be value to
characterizing misleading assertions or nondisclosures relating to experience or
credentials as something other than misrepresentation. An action for negligent
failure to obtain informed consent offers one option for framing a case in a way
that minimizes the issue of dishonesty and therefore the risk of triggering an
exclusion from coverage.
In the medical context, a doctor has a duty to disclose the material risks of,
and the alternatives to, a proposed course of treatment. 181 Failure to obtain
informed consent is a form of negligence, even if the doctor otherwise acts
carefully in rendering professional services. Recent case law from the medical
field provides useful guidance about how misrepresentation of information
regarding credentials or experience might be treated as a violation of the
professional duty to secure informed consent from a patient or a client.
In Howard v. University of Medicine & Dentistry of New Jersey,182 the
Supreme Court of New Jersey considered "what causes of action will lie when
a plaintiff contends that a physician misrepl esented his credentials and
238 (Colo. 1995) (stating, in an action by a bank against a town's attorneys. that "[r]eliance is
a necessary element of a claim for negligent misrepresentation").
180. See 9 COUCH ON INSURANCE. supra note 153. § 131:21 (slating that "[a]ttorneys
professional liability insurance policies frequently exclude from coverage any dishonest.
fraudulent. criminal or malicious act or omission") (internal quotations omitted).
181. See generall.'>' Laurel R. Hanson. Note, Informed Consent and the Scope (~f ([
Physician '.I' Duty of Disclosure. 77 N.D. L. REV. 71,71 (2001) (exploring the nature of "what
a physician must tell a patient in order to achieve full disclosure"); see also DOBBS. supra note
126. at 653 (stating that "patients are entitled to information about the risks of ... the
procedure. its necessity. and alternative procedures that might be preferable"); (f Grant H.
Morris. Dissing Disclosure: Just What the Doctor Ordered, 44 ARlZ. L. REV. 313, 315 (2002)
(stating that while "[i]n the latter half of the twentieth century, the legal requirement of informed
consent became well-established in all fifty states," as a practical reality, "it did not").
182. 800 A.2d 73 (N.J. 2002).
~
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experience at the time he obtained the plaintiff's consent to surgery."183 In
Howard, the plaintiff husband and wife alleged that the defendant neurosurgeon
had falsely represented that he was board certified and had "performed
approximately sixty corpectomies in each of the eleven years he had been
performing such surgical procedures." 184 The wife "was opposed to the surgery
and it was only after [the doctor's] specific claims of skill and experience that
she and her husband decided to go ahead with the procedure." 185
The court held that misrepresentations about a physician's credentials and
experience supported a claim for lack of informed consent, but not "a separate
and distinct claim based on fraud.,,186 The court failed to explain why a claim
for fraud was unavailable,187 but concluded that it was "not convinced that ...
a novel fraud or deceit-based cause of action" was necessary where such claim
"would admit of the possibility of punitive damages, and ... circumvent the
requirements for proof of both causation and damages imposed in a traditional
informed consent setting."188 The court was "especially reluctant" to extend the
law because "plaintiff'S damages from this alleged 'fraud' [arose] exclusively
from the doctor-patient relationship ...."189
The alleged fault of the defendant in Howard was outright lying, not simply
nondisclosure. Why the court was concerned that punitive damages would be
imposed if outright lying was proved is unclear. In addition, it is far from
apparent why an action for fraud "would circumvent the requirements for proof
of both causation and damages imposed in a traditional informed consent
setting."I90 Causation and damages are elements of an action for fraud. 191 The
183.
184.
185.
186.

/d. at 75.
[d. at 76.
Jd.
ld. at 77.
187. The court merely noted:
Few jurisdictions have confronted the question of what cause of action should
lie when a doctor allegedly misrepresents his credentials or experience. . . .
Although some suggest that a claim based in fraud may be appropriate if a doctor
actively misrepresents his or her background or credentials, we are aware of no
court that has so held.
/d. at 81-82.
188. ld. at 82.
189. ld.
190. See id.
191. See, e.g., Dresser-Rand Co. v. Virtual Automation Inc., 361 F.3d 831, 843 (5th Cir.
2004) ("Among the essential elements of fraud is a showing of injury suffered because of the
fraud."); Vega v. Jones, Day, Reavis & Pogue, 17 Cal. Rptr. 3d 26, 31 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004)
(defining the elements of fraud as "(1) representation; (2) falsity; (3) knowledge offalsity; (4)
intent to deceive; and (5) reliance and resulting damage (causation)"); Viguers v. Philip Morris
USA, Inc., 837 A.2d 534, 540 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2003) (stating that causation of damage is an
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court's reluctance to entertain a fraud claim arising exclusively from a doctorpatient relationship is puzzling. 191 The case involved alleged lying in the course
of afiduciary relationship. The one case cited by the court sheds little light on
its reluctance to permit a claim for fraud. 193 One would have expected the court
to announce that deceit actively practiced on a patient by a physician is
intolerable, and that outright lying about credentials or experience is actionable
fraud. Perhaps the court was only trying to ensure that a judgment in favor of
the plaintiff would be covered by the defendant's malpractice insurance, which
would cover negligence but not fraudulent conduct.
On the subject of informed consent, the Howard court held that "significant
misrepresentations concerning a physician's qualifications can affect the validity
of consent obtained." 194
The court further stated that "a serious
misrepresentation concerning the quality or exten . ')f a physician's professional
experience ... can be material to the grant of intelligent and informed consent
to the procedure."'95
The plaintiff husband in Howard alleged that "defendant's
misrepresentations induced [him] to consent to a surgical procedure ... that he
would not have undergone had he known the truth about defendant's
qualifications.,,'96 Ultimately, the court held that plaintiffs claim was founded
on "lack of informed consent." 197
Under informed-consent law, a factor that increases the risk of harm needs to
be disclosed only if it is material. 198 The Howard court concluded that "if an
objectively reasonable person could find that physician experience was material
in determining the medical risk of the corpectomy procedure to which plaintiff
consented, ... and if a reasonably prudent person in plaintiffs position ...

essential element in a fraud case).
192. See Howard, 800 A.2d at 82.
193. The Howard court cited Spinosa v. Weinstein. 571 N.Y.S.2d 747. 753 (N.Y. App. Div.
1991 ). for the proposition that
concealment or failure to disclose [a] doctor's own malpractice does not give rise
to claim of fraud or deceit independent of medical malpractice, and ... [the]
intentional tort of fraud [is] actionable only when the alleged fraud occurs
separately from and subsequent to the malpractice ... and then only where the
fraud claim gives rise to damages separate and distinct from those flowing from
the malpractice.
Huward, 800 A.2d at 82 (internal quotations and alterations omitted).
194. Id. at 83.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 84.
197. Jd.
198. See, e.g., Scott v. Bradford, 606 P.2d 554. 557-58 (Okla. 1979).
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informed of the [doctor's] misrepresentations about his experience would not
have consented, then a claim ... may be maintained.,,'99
The court opined that it would be inherently difficult for plaintiffs to meet the
materiality standard2°O because that would require proof that the defendant's true
level of experience increased the risk of injury from the procedures the
defendant performed. 201 If what the Howard court means is that the plaintiff
must quantify with particularity the degree, perhaps in percentage format, to
which the lack of credentials or experience increased the risk of harm, the
standard is formidable indeed. That type of approach in medical malpractice
cases involving the loss-of-a-chance doctrine 202 has often denied recovery to
plaintiffs. 203 In Howard, the court clearly intended to set a high bar for recovery
based on misrepresentation of credentials or experience, for the court explained
the "stringent test" as imposing "a significant gatekeeper function on the trial
court to prevent insubstantial claims concerning alleged misrepresentations
about a physician's experience from proceeding to a jury. ,,204 The court created
a two-prong test for establishing proximate cause when doctors misrepresent
their experience: (1) "whether the more limited experience or credentials
199. Howard, 800 A.2d at 84. New Jersey uses an objective test for proving that
nondisclosure of a material risk caused harm in informed-consent cases. Most states take a
similar approach. See, e.g., Ashe v. Radiation Oncology Assocs., 9 S. W.3d 119 (Tenn. 2000)
(endorsing the majority objective standard). But see Scott, 606 P.2d at 559 (stating that the
majority rule "severely limits the protection granted an injured patient").
200. Howard. 800 A.2d at 84 (stating that "most informed consent issues are unlikely to
implicate a setting in which a physician's experience or credentials have been demonstrated to
be a material element affecting the risk of undertaking a specific procedure").
20 I. /d. at 84-85 (establishing a demanding standard for proving a substantially increased
risk). According to the court, a patient must "prove that the actual level of experience possessed
by [the doctor] had a direct and demonstrable relationship to the harm" and that nondisclosure
of the doctor's "true level of qualifications and experience increased [the patient's] risk .... "
Id.
202. Some courts hold that the loss of a chance to cure a disease or mitigate some other
medical problem qualifies as a type of harm for which recovery is available. Tortious conduct
that causes an increased risk of harm, such as a greater risk of developing cancer, is also
actionable. See Alberts v. Schultz, 975 P.2d 1279, 1283 (N.M. 1999) (stating that "under the
lost-chance theory, the patient does not allege that the malpractice caused his or her entire
injury" but ratherthat "the health care provider's negligence reduced the chance of avoiding the
injury actually sustained").
203. See, e.g., Waffen v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 799 F.2d 911, 923 (4th CiT.
1986) (holding that an admission of "some undefinable chance" that the plaintiff might have
survived had she been promptly treated was not a sufficient predicate for an award of damages);
Alberts. 975 P.2d at 1288 (recognizing the loss-of-a-chan~<: doctrine but denying recovery
because the plaintifffailed to prove that timely medical intervention would have prevented his
deterioration).
204. Howard, 800 A.2d at 85.
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possessed by [the doctor] could have substantially increased [the patient's] risk"
and (2) "whether that substantially increased risk would cause a reasonably
prudent person not to consent to undergo the procedure.''205
If the plaintiff is able to surmount the high bar for proving proximate
causation of harm, under Howard, recovery is permitted even if the physician
otherwise exercised care in performing professional services?)6 The
misrepresentation of credentials or experience is all that is needed to establish
that a duty was breached.
Howard offers guidance to courts dealing with the issue of misrepresentation
of credentials or experience in lawyer-client relationships. Although the
informed-consent doctrine has yet to find equally clear recognition in the legal
malpractice field as in medical malpractice, "there is good authority that the
same principles apply as readily in law as in medicine."207 However, it is
important to consider carefully what Howard did not decide, what it decided
205. /d. The court further noted:
The court's gatekeeper function in respect of the first question will require a
determination that a genuine issue of material fact exists requiring resolution by
the factfmder in order to proceed to the second question .... [Tlhe trial court must
conclude that there is a genuine issue of material fact concerning both questions
in order to allow the claim to proceed to trial.
Id.
206. ld.
207. Johnson, Candor, supra note 4, at 749; see also id. at 749 n.37 (citing, inter alia, Sierra
Fria Corp. v. Donald J. Evans, P.e., 127 F.3d 175, 179-80 (I st Cir. 1997)). In Sierra Fria, the
court wrote:
[Wlhen a client seeks advice from an attorney, the attorney owes the client a duty
of full and fair disclosure of facts material to the client's interests. This means that
the attorney must advise the client of any significant legal risks involved in a
contemplated transaction, and must do so in terms sufficiently plain to pennit the
client to assess both the risks and their potential impact on his situation.
Sierra Fria, 127 F.3d at 180 (internal quotations and citations omitted). The Sierra Fria court
found the defendant law firm had repeatedly warned its client of the dangers of consummating
a property purchase without a survey, and therefore the firm was not liable to the client. [d. at
184. "Some scholars call for an informed consent doctrine in legal malpractice, such as has
become a standard in medical malpractice." Lerman, supra note 2, at 670. Professor Lerman
further states that the informed consent standard for attorneys should be broad, "based on what
the client might reasonably want to know [whichl would encompass information about issues
such as expertise, error, and billing that appear to be common subjects of deception." Id. at 685
n.95; see also id. at 669 n.39 (citing Marcy Strauss, Toward a Revised Model ofAttorney-Client
Relationship: The Argumentfor Autonomy, 65 N.e. L. REV. 315 (1987)); id. at 670 n.41 (citing
Roger W. Andersen, Informed Decisionmaking in an Office Practice, 28 B.e.L. REV. 225
(1987). Susan R. Martyn, Informed Consent in the Practice ofLaw. 48 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 307
(1980), and Mark Spiegel, Lawyering and Client Decisionmaking: Informed Consent and the
Legal Profession, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 41, 41 (1979»; id. at 701 n.168 (citing DOUGLAS E.
ROSENTHAL, LAWYER AND CUENT: WHO'S IN CHARGE 154-55 (1974)).
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incorrectly, and what advantages an infonned-consent theory has over
alternative causes of action. First, Howard did not address whether there is a
professional duty to disclose information about credentials or experience. 208
Rather, the court limited itself to an analysis of theories of recovery applicable
in a case where a misrepresentation allegedly has been made by an affirmative
misstatement. 209 There is, however, no reason why informed consent principles
should not be applied to cases involving nondisclosure rather than affirmative
misrepresentation. Doctors have been held liable for not disclosing, rather than
actively misrepresenting, material facts,210 and courts have said that the same
principles apply to lawyers.211
Still, Howard's general endorsement of an informed-consent approach to
dealing with issues relating to credentials and experience is sound. "Experience
and success rate of the physician or surgeon are relevant, not to the decision to
accept treatment, but to the decision to accept it at the hands of the
defendant. .. ."212 Recent decisions by courts ofWisconsin,213 Maryland,214 and
Delaware 215 have held that there is a duty on doctors, enforceable in an
208. Howard, 800 A.2d at 82 (stating that "case law never has held that a doctor has a duty
to detail his background and experience as part of the required informed consent disclosure; nor
are we called on to decide that question here").
209. Id. at 83.
210. See, e.g., Haley v. United States, 739 F.2d 1502 (10th Cir. 1984) (imposing liability
because physicians did not adequately inform a patient about the potential for wound infection).
211. See Sierra Fria Corp., 127 F.3d at 179-80.
212. DOBBS, supra note 126, at 660-61; see also Hales v. Pittman, 576 P .2d 493, 500 (Ariz.
1978) (opining that, when consenting to medical treatment, "a person needs information not
only concerning the statistical probabilities of various adverse results ... but also ...
information concerning the treating physician's experience with the particular procedure").
213. See Johnson by Adler v. Kokemoor, 545 N.W.2d 495, 507 (Wis. 1996) (holding that,
when different physicians have substantially different success rates with the same procedure and
a reasonable person in the patient's position would consider such infornlation material, such
statistical evidence may be admitted in an informed-consent case in which the plaintiff contends
that the defendant surgeon failed to disclose his own inexperience); see also Richard A.
Heinemann, Pushing the Limits of Informed Consent: Johnson v. Kokemoor and PhysiciallSpecific Disclosure, 1997 WIS. L. REV. 1079, 1093-94 (stating that "prior to Johnson, disclosure
of a physician's comparative risk data had been required in only one jurisdiction," namely
Arizona); Jennifer Wolfberg, Two Kinds of Statistics, The Kind You Look Up and the Kind You
Make Up: A Critical Analysis of Comparative Provider Statistics and the Doctrine of Informed
Consent, 29 PEPP. L. REV. 585, 585 (2002) (opining that "it is just a matter of time before the
rest of the country eventually follows suit with Wisconsin and broadens the doctrine of informed
consent to include provisions of provider statistics").
214. See Dingle v. Belin, 749 A.2d 157, i 65-66 (Md. 2000) (stating th:ll, to obtain informed
consent, it may be necessary to disclose precisely who will be conducting or superintending the
procedure or therapy).
215. See Barriocanal v. Gibbs, 697 A.2d 1169 (Del. Super. Ct. 1997) (holding that a trial
court improperly excluded expert testimony that a surgeon breached the standard of care for
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informed-consent action, to disclose information about their past experience to
patients. 216 There is, however, also authority to the contrary, and a number of
courts have held that nondisclosure of information about medical credentials or
experience will not support an action based on lack of informed consent. 217 If
information about experience and success rate is material to selecting a doctor/Is
then it is also at least arguably relevant to selecting an attorney.
Second, Howard' s conclusion that an action for fraud is not available against
a professional for an outright lie relating to credentials or experience cannot be
justified. A misstatement of fact, made with knowledge of falsity or reckless
disregard for the truth, is actionable fraud. The rule is ubiquitously applicable
to a broad range of contexts. 219 Surely, "[a] fraud claim against a lawyer is no
different from a fraud claim against anyone else.'>220 There is no good reason
why a false statement of material fact about a doctor's or lawyer's credentials
or past experience cannot support an action for fraud, provided that each of the
requirements of the tort is met. More than a century ago, the Supreme Court of
infonned consent by failing to infonn a patient of his lack of recent aneurysm surgery).
216. See also Hidding v. Williams, 578 So. 2d 1192, 1198 (La. Ct. App. 1991) (holding that
a physician's failure to disclose his chronic alcohol abuse to a patient and his wife vitiated their
consent to surgery).
217. See, e.g., Abram by Abram v. Children's Hosp., 542 N.Y.S.2d 418, 418-19 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1989) (holding that, under state statutes, a patient could not state a claim for lack of
infonned consent based on defendant's failure to disclose the providers' qualifications); Duttry
v. Patterson, 771 A.2d 1255, 1259 (Pa. 2001) (holding that a surgeon's personal characteristics
and experience are irrelevant to an infonned consent claim); Kaskie v. Wright, 589 A.2d 213,
216 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991) (holding that parents could not state a cause of action for lack of
infonned consent where they were not infonned before their son's operation that the surgeon
was an alcoholic and unlicensed to practice medicine); Whiteside v. Lukson, 947 P.2d 1263,
1265 (Wash. Ct. App. 1997) (holding that "a surgeon's lack of experience in perfonning a
particular surgical procedure is not a material fact for purposes ... of failure to secure an
infonned consent").
218. See generally Emmanuel O. Iheukwumere, Doctor. Are You Experienced?: The
Relevance of Disclosure of Physician Experience to a Valid Informed Consent, 18 J. CONTEMP.
HEALTH L. & POL'Y 373 (2002); Aaron D. Twerski & Neil B. Cohen, The Second Revolution
in Illfonlled Consent: Comparing Physicians to Each Other, 94 Nw. U. L. REV. I (1999).
Infonnation relating to a professional's prior success rate has been recognized as material
in other areas as well. See. e.g., Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Commonwealth Fin.
Group, 874 F. Supp. 1345, 1353-54 (S.D. Fla. 1994) (holding that misrepresentations regarding
the trading record and experience of a tinn or broker are fraudulent because "past success and
experience are material factors which a reasonable investor would consider when deciding to
invest ... through that finn or broker").
219. Findings of fraud range from prosaic assertions contained in the balance sheets, on one
hand, see Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, Niven & Co., 174 N.E. 441 (N.Y. 1931), to dicey
conversations used to induce another to have sex, on the other, see Kathleen K. v. Robert B.,
198 Cal. Rptr. 273 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984).
220. Vega v. Jones, Day, Reavis & Pogue, 17 Cal. Rptr. 3d 26, 31 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004).
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Michigan held that misrepresentation about the credentials of a physician's
assistant was actionable deceit. Z21
Third, the informed-consent theory also offers considerable advantages for
dealing with the difficult question of whether an attorney has a duty to disclose
facts within the scope of a fiduciary relationship relating to credentials or
experience. 222 The two-part test for proximate causation articulated in Howard
offers a reasonable approach to dealing with issues of liability based on
nondisclosure. 223 Absent proof that the nondisclosure by the lawyer involved
facts basic to the transaction,224 facts not reasonably discoverable,225 or facts that
were required to be disclosed because of the adversity of interests between the
lawyer and client,226 or by the demands of reasonable care,227 the scope of
liability should be tightly limited. Using the informed-consent rationale
articulated in Howard, recovery would be permitted only where the defendant's
deficiency in credentials or experience increased the risk of harm that the
plaintiff suffered and a reasonable person would not have consented to the
representation because of the increased risk. 228
Finally, in the medical context, some courts have held the availability of an
adequate informed-consent remedy obviates the need for an additional action
based on breach of trust. 229 Presumably, attorney-defendants could argue that
the same limitations should apply in the lawyer-client context if the judiciary

221. See De May v. Roberts, 9 N.W. 146 (Mich. 1881). De May involved a physician who
brought a young man without medical qualifications to the plaintiff s home to assist him in
attending to a woman while she gave birth. /d. at 146. Because the assistant's lack of training
was not disclosed. the court held that the woman's consent to his presence and touching did "not
preclude her from maintaining an action and recovering substantial damages upon afterwards
ascertaining his true character." Id. at 149. The court found that both the doctor and his alleged
assistant were "guilty of deceit" for "obtaining admission at such a time and under such
circumstances without fully disclosing [the assistant's] true character," and thus. the plaintiff
could recover damages. Id.
222. See supra Part II.A.3.
223. See Howard v. Univ. of Med. & Dentistry of N.J., 800 A.2d 73 (N.J. 2002).
224. See supra Part II.A.I.
225. See supra Part II.A.2.
226. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
227. See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
228. See Howard, 800 A.2d at 85.
229. See Hales v. Pittman. 576 P.2d 493. 497 (Ariz. 1978) ("We do not believe that the law
in Arizona should be extended to recognize a new cause of action based on breach of trust when
an adequate remedy for this case already exists."); see also Neade v. Portes, 739 N.E.2d 496.
503 (Ill. 2000) (holding that a cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty, based on a
physician's failure to disclose his alleged financial interest in a medical incentive fund. could
not be maintained because it was duplicative of a medical negligence claim).
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recognizes an informed-consent action against lawyers who misrepresent
credentials or experience. 230
IV. Conclusion

Whether attorneys can be held liable for statements made, or matters not
disclosed, regarding their credentials or experience are questions of ubiquitous
importance. The questions implicate concerns that are continuously relevant in
law practice and potentially bear upon every actual or potential lawyer-client
relationship. How these queries are answered will set the standard for the
conduct of attorneys in thousands of law offices. The answers will also
influence what information is provided or denied to millions of consumers of
legal services.
Basic principles of American tort law provide useful guidance in defining the
disclosure obligations of attorneys. But like tort law itself, the answers are not
simple. What an attorney may, must, or may not do is determined by a matrix
of rules, which speak to an array of policy considerations that have shaped the
law of fraud, fiduciary duty, negligent misrepresentation, and informed consent.
By way of summary, with respect to material matters relating to their
credentials and experience: Attorneys must not engage in intentional, reckless,
or negligent falsification of the facts. 23 ! Attorneys must disclose facts that are
basic to the transaction,232 not reasonably discoverable,233 or directly relevant to
the representation. 234 Attorneys must also disclose information that is necessary
to prevent partial statements from being misleading235 or that is otherwise called
for by the duty of reasonable care 236 or by an actual adversity of interests
between lawyer and client. 237 Moreover, attorneys may express favorable
opinions about their qualifications, but in doing so, they must not r;,;isrepresent
their state of mind or imply false facts. 238 Finally, attorneys must exercise
230. Cj. Aiken v. Hancock, 115 S.W.3d 26, 28-29 (Tex. App. 2003) (holding that a former
client's allegations that his attorney falsely represented that he was prepared to try the case and
that an expert witness was prepared to testify were actionable under a theory of legal
malpractice, but did not constitute a claim for breach of fiduciary duty).
231. See supra Part II.C (discussing outright lies) and Part lILA (discussing negligent
misrepresentation).
232. See supra Part II. A. I.
233. See supra Part III.A.2.
234. See supra note 69 and accompanying text (discussing disclosures called for by new
developments in representation).
235. See supra Part U.B.1 (discussing half-truths).
236. See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
237. See supra Part II.A.3 (discussing when the duty of "absolute and perfect candor"
applies).
238. See supra Part n.B.2.
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reasonable care to ensure that clients are able to give informed consent to
decisions pertaining to the representation. 239 Complying with these rules, though
difficult, is an essential step in assuring that clients are treated fairly by those
who represent their interests.

239. See supra Part III.B.

